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I.

INTRODUCTION

Companies, policymakers, and scholars alike are paying increasing
attention to the use of machine learning (ML) in recruitment and hiring, most
notably in the form of ML-based employee selection tools that use algorithms
in place of traditional employment tests and the judgment of human
recruiters.' To its advocates, ML-based selection processes can be more
effective in choosing the strongest candidates, increasing diversity, and
reducing the influence of human prejudices. 2 Many observers, however,
express concern about other forms of bias that can infect algorithmic selection
procedures, leading to fears regarding the potential for algorithms to create
unintended discriminatory effects, reinforce existing patterns of
discrimination, or mask more deliberate forms of discrimination. 3
In the Authors' experiences, most employers very much want to improve
diversity and inclusion, from company leadership down to the most junior
hourly employees. Companies pursue these objectives not just to avoid legal
liability for violating antidiscrimination statutes, but also because they have
concluded that a more diverse and inclusive workforce is better from both a

*
Analytics Associate, Littler Mendelson, P.C.
**
Shareholder, Littler Mendelson, P.C.
***
Shareholder, Littler Mendelson, P.C.
1.
See Gil Press, 120 Al Predictionsfor 2019, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2018, 12:00 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2018/12/09/120-ai-predictions-for-2019/#54aa4326688c
[https://perma.cc/XTS4-EL9P]; Neelie Verlinden, Machine Learning in Recruitment & How to
Do It Right, HARVER (Oct. 23, 2018, 3:53 PM), https://harver.com/blog/machine-learning-inrecruitment/ [https://perma.cc/RPR3-T29M]
(discussing how machine learning uses
algorithms).
2.
See HAIYAN ZHANG ET AL., THE ROLE OF
DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION 6 (2019).

3.

Al

IN MITIGATING BIAS TO ENHANCE

See id. at 8.
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business perspective 4 and an ethical perspective.5 Indeed, many (if not most)
of the employers who are turning to algorithmic and data-driven selection
tools are doing so in part because they want to guard against human biases
that can serve as barriers to employment for disadvantaged groups.6
Not coincidentally, the eradication of such barriers is, as the Supreme
Court long ago recognized, the overarching objective of antidiscrimination
laws.7 Because this is an area where the objectives of the law and of America's
businesses are well-aligned, 8 one would think that the law should serve as an
inducement rather than a deterrent to companies who wish to deploy
algorithmic selection tools that will allow them to improve both the quality
and diversity of their employees. Unfortunately, that has not been the case. 9
The rules governing employment tests and other employee selection
procedures were developed in the 1970s and have remained largely
unchanged in the decades since.' 0 Those rules, written as they were for paperand-pencil tests and other in-person examinations, are ill-suited for selection
procedures that rely on a candidate's historical data rather than real-time
observations and firsthand assessments. Complicating matters further, the
complexity of the algorithms that underlie ML-based selection tools makes it

4.

See, e.g., Dennis Nally, Five Reasons Why Diversity and Inclusion Matter to Every

Business-andEvery Employee, PwC: CEO INSIGHTS (June 15, 2015), https://pwc.blogs.com

/ceoinsights/2015/06/five-reasons-why-diversity-and-inclusion-matter.html

[https://penna.cc

/N7W9-EPGJ] (noting that 85% of surveyed CEOs whose companies have diversity and
inclusion strategies say that it has "improved their bottom line"); DELOITTE, 2017 BOARD
DIVERSITY SURVEY: SEEING IS BELIEVING 8 (2017) (noting that over 90% of respondents
believe that greater diversity on a company's board of directors enables an organization to
improve its ability to innovate, ability to manage disruptions, and overall business performance).
See generally MARK KAPLAN & MASON DONOVAN, THE INCLUSION DIVIDEND (2013) (noting

that diversity and inclusion should lead to a decrease of expenses or an increase of revenue).
5.
See Nally, supra note 4 ("Diversity and inclusion are quite simply the right thing to
do[.] It's about creating equal opportunities for everyone and we can all see signs of progress.
But the statistics make it equally clear that there's still a long way to go.").
6. See Nicole Lewis, Will Al Remove Hiring Bias?, SHRM (Nov. 12,
2018), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/talent-acquisition/pages/will-airemove-hiring-bias-hr-technology.aspx [https://perma.cc/FM3Y-4WL8].
7.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971) ("The objective of Congress
in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality
of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees . . .What is required by Congress
is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.").
8.
See Lewis, supra note 6 ("A study from McKinsey and Company found that
companies that have a diverse workforce financially outperform companies that don't.").
9.
See id. ("Discrimination in hiring, however, is proving difficult to reverse.").
10. Michael A. McDaniel et al., The Uniform Guidelines Are a Detriment to the Fieldof
PersonnelSelection, 4 INDUS. & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 494, 507 (2011).
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difficult for employers and employees alike to discern how and why an
algorithm came up with its scores, rankings, or recommendations." This
Article seeks to both highlight the challenges employers, workers, courts, and
agencies will face as companies develop and deploy algorithmic selection
tools, and propose a framework through which courts and agencies can assess
whether such tools comply with antidiscrimination laws.
Part II begins with a brief overview of the technological concepts that
underlie algorithmic employee selection procedures. It continues with a
discussion of the development of antidiscrimination laws, along with the
broader philosophical and legal principles that animate the two major forms
of employment discrimination-disparate treatment and disparate impact.
Part III details why algorithmic selection procedures fit poorly into the legal
framework that has developed around Title VII and similar antidiscrimination
laws.
Part IV proposes a uniform analytical framework through which agencies
and courts can analyze whether an employer using a particular algorithmic
selection tool has engaged in disparate treatment or disparate impact. The

proposed framework is built upon three unifying themes:
*

In light of the low practical value of statistical significance tests
in the age of Big Data, flexible tests of reasonableness should
replace inflexible tests of statistical significance when assessing
whether a correlation is legally meaningful;

*

Courts and agencies should recognize certain forms of ML-based
fairness techniques as acceptable ways for employers to mitigate
disparate impacts without exposing themselves to disparate
treatment liability; and

*

Standards for assessing the validity of an algorithmic selection
procedure should focus on whether the procedure is based on the
essential and important job functions of a particular position, as
identified through an adequate job analysis and incorporated into
a properly constructed model.

This framework, we posit, would give full effect to the objectives of
antidiscrimination laws without discouraging employers from using machine
learning and Big Data not only to increase efficiency, but also to improve
11. See Gregory Barber, Shark or Baseball? Inside the Black Box' of a Neural Network,
WIRED (Mar. 6, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/inside-black-box-of-neuralnetwork/ [https://perna.cc/43U5-TMVD] (noting that how neural networks work is still a
mystery).
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diversity and reduce the effects of human biases on the recruitment and hiring
process.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Algorithmic Selection Tools

Many of the principles discussed in this Article will be relevant to all
forms of data-driven employee selection procedures. But the primary focus
will be on algorithmic tools1 2 that utilize machine learning with a particular
emphasis on those that use deep learning. Tools that rely on these
sophisticated algorithmic methods pose challenges that exceed those of earlier
generations of data-driven employee selection tools.' 3
1.

Machine Learning and Deep Learning

Machine learning is a branch of artificial intelligence consisting of
algorithms that learn from data.' 4 In this context, "learn" means that the

algorithm uses statistical methods and "data-driven insights" to allow an Al
system to improve itself without human intervention." A learning algorithm

uses training data to build a statistical model that can then be used to make
predictions or other decisions about new data.16 Learning algorithms may
entail varying levels of mathematical and computational complexity. The
highest profile breakthroughs in artificial intelligence over the past several
years have come from a subfield of machine learning known as deep

12. This Article will generally use the term "tool" to refer to such algorithmic programs
both as a convenient shorthand and to suggest that for the foreseeable future, employers likely
will be using algorithmic selection procedures primarily to supplement or improve their existing
human-driven employee selection process. This Article will also use the terms "tool," "test," and
"selection procedure" interchangeably to refer to algorithmic systems and programs that are used
to make, or to help an employer make, personnel decisions. For the most part, this Article will
focus on hiring, but in most cases, the same principles will apply to the use of algorithms to
make decisions regarding placement, compensation, promotion, termination, transfer, or other
actions that affect aspects of employment.
13. Cf ZHANG ET AL., supra note 2 (noting that Al algorithms are reliant on human data
and can lead to biases).
14.

IAN GOODFELLOW ET AL., DEEP LEARNING 96 (2016); Verlinden, supra note 1.

15. Tobias Baer & Vishnu Kamalnath, Controlling Machine-learning Algorithms and
Their Biases, MCKINSEY & CO. 1 (Nov. 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/businessfunctions/risk/our-insights/controlling-machine-learning-algorithms-and-their-biases#
[https://perma.cc/745L-C45M].
16. Learning
Algorithm,
TECHOPEDIA,
https://www.techopedia.com/
definition/33426/learning-algorithm [https://perma.cc/53NE-ACH8/].
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learning.' 7 Deep learning involves the use of artificial neural networks that are
inspired by how neurons in the human brain are thought to interact with each
other.18 A neural network operates by taking certain data as an input and
passing that data through one or more layers of artificial "neurons" that
analyze and transform the data.19
Most machine learning approaches can be classified under one of two
broad headings: supervised learning or unsupervised learning. 20 In supervised
learning, the training data is labeled by humans. 2 1 In unsupervised learning,
by contrast, the algorithm proceeds by looking for patterns in unlabeled data.22
In general, supervised learning techniques are better suited for applications
where the developers are interested in predicting a specific outcome. 23 For

example, to build an algorithm that takes photographic images as inputs and
that will output a prediction as to whether the image contains a cat, a sensible
approach would be to use supervised learning where the training data consists
of images that humans have reviewed and labeled as "cat" or "not a cat." On
the other hand, an unsupervised learning algorithm might be an appropriate
choice for a more general object-recognition algorithm, where the algorithm
would receive unlabeled images as input, examine the content of each image,
and identify groups of images that it identifies as having shared
characteristics.24

In technical parlance, the data sets used to train learning algorithms are
said to consist of "instances" (also known as examples, observations, subjects,

17. Tom Simonite, The WIRED Guide to Artificial Intelligence, WInED (Feb. 1, 2018,
9:22 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/guide-artificial-intelligence/ [https://penna.cc/QR4ECGXB].
18.

See Chris Nicholson, A Beginner's Guide to Neural Networks and Deep Learning,

SKYMIND, https://skymind.ai/wiki/neural-network [https://perma.cc/4YFU-XS7N] [hereinafter
A Beginner's Guide].

19. Id.
20. Id. A third type of machine learning is reinforcement learning. A reinforcement
learning algorithm is conceptually similar to a supervised learning algorithm except that, rather
than using human-labeled training data for optimization, it optimizes itself by updating its
decision-making strategy in response to feedback received on prior decisions, usually via a
reward function. See Chris Nicholson, A Beginner 's Guide to Deep Reinforcement Learning,
PATHMIND, https://pathmind.com/wiki/deep-reinforcement-learning [https://perma.cc/4N7APMEP]. This type of machine learning has become prominent in many spheres, but it seems
unlikely to have much application in the context of recruitment and hiring algorithms in the near
future and thus is not discussed further in this Article.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23.

See Chris Nicholson, A Beginner's Guide to Supervised Learning, SKYMIND,

https://skymind.ai/wiki/supervised-learning [https://perma.cc/57JY-JAN3].
24.

See A Beginner's Guide, supra note 18.
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or units) and "attributes" (also known as features or covariates). 25 Instances
generally correspond to the rows on a spreadsheet 26 and, for purposes of the
types of tools that are the subject of this Article, most often represent
individual persons. Attributes are the measurable properties and
characteristics of interest for each instance and are analogous to column
headings in spreadsheets, such as "educational attainment" or "years of
experience." 27 The number of attributes included in a dataset is referred to as
the "dimensionality" of the data set.28
While a detailed description of deep learning architectures is beyond the
scope of this Article, a few characteristics are notably relevant to the legal
challenges that employers using algorithmic selection tools will likely face.
Deep learning uses neural networks and various mathematical and statistical
techniques to determine a set of parameters that an algorithm can use to make
predictions based on a given set of input attributes. 29 To determine that
optimal set of parameters, deep learning uses the neural network to combine,
abstract (and recombine and re-abstract), and otherwise transform the input
attributes as they pass through multiple layers of the neural network. 30 This
process is repeated thousands or millions of times, with the algorithm making
slight adjustments to the parameters during each iteration. 31 The process
continues until the model finds an optimal set of parameters-that is, until the
model reaches a point where further slight adjustments to the parameters will
no longer improve the model's accuracy on the training data.3 2 The resulting
parameters are what the algorithm ultimately uses to make predictions.33
Importantly for legal purposes, the optimized parameters cannot be

expressed easily and reliably in terms of the original attributes that were used
as inputs, particularly if the algorithm regularly receives new training data.
The complexity of the calculations embedded in the deep learning process
25.

6,

Jason Brownlee, Data, LearningandModeling, MACHINE LEARNING MASTERY (Jan.

2017),

https://machineleamingmastery.com/data-learning-and-modeling/

[https://perma.cc/3VTW-XK3P].
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. Stephanie Glen, Dimensionality & High DimensionalData: Definition, Examples,
Curse
of,
STATISTICS
How
To
(Oct.
10,
2016),
https://www.statisticshowto.datasciencecentral.com/dimensionality/
[https://perma.cc/F363VY4S].
29.

See A Beginner's Guide, supra note 18.

30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id The optima generally referred to here are local optima, rather than global or
absolute optima. This feature has important implications for how courts should assess
algorithmic selection tools under antidiscrimination laws. See infra Section IV.E.
33. See A Beginner's Guide, supra note 18.
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means that the algorithm generates the parameters that will not be readily
interpretable, and the exact path through which the algorithm arrived at those
parameters might not be practically traceable or capable of reconstruction.
Consequently, even if the developer of an algorithm knows and understands
all of the input variables (hardly a given in the age of Big Data) and also knows
the target variables (or criteria) on which the algorithm optimizes, the
algorithmic tool may nevertheless be effectively opaque even to the
developer, much less the broader public. That is why deep learning algorithms
are often referred to as "black box" algorithms. 34 Once the developer has
specified the target (or criterion) by which success is judged, and selected the
attributes that are potential predictors, the means by which the algorithm
determines the parameters that result in the most accurate predictions is
opaque.35
2.

Algorithmic Employee Selection

This Article is focused on algorithmic tools designed to make predictions
about job candidates' suitability for particular jobs. Today, building such a
prediction system is generally best accomplished through supervised learning.
The training data for a particular job will generally consist of historical
examples of employees who have held the same job or a similar job, and
possibly candidates who have applied for such jobs but who were not
ultimately hired. In such a data set, the instances in the training data are
individual employees or candidates, while the attributes consist of data on
various characteristics of those employees or candidates. The labels for this
training data would be information indicating each employee or candidate's
actual or projected performance in the job.
As an example, say that an employer wants to predict job candidates'
future job performance based on their educational attainment and experience.
For training data, the employer has a data set consisting of 100 current

employees' educational attainment and years of experience at the time of hire,
with each employee labeled with their most recent performance rating. In this
example, the 100 employees are the instances for the training data, whereas
educational attainment, performance rating, and years of service are attributes.
If this data were used to build a standard statistical model (not necessarily one
that uses machine learning), 36 performance rating would be termed the target
34.
35.
generate
36.
analysis,

See Barber, supra note 11.
See generally id. (discussing the difficulty of determining how neural networks
complex outcomes).
In fact, it would make little sense to use deep learning, rather than simple regression
to create a predictive model on such a simple data set.
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variable while educational attainment and years of service would be termed
the predictor variables. 37
But in deep learning, and as stated above, the algorithm ultimately makes
its predictions by using the final set of parameters that the trained algorithm
generates rather than directly using the original input attributes.38 Those
original inputs are the raw materials for the resulting model, but the algorithm
transforms them into something unrecognizable when it actually constructs
the model.39 Consequently, the final parameters, rather than the original
attributes that the employer included in the training data are, in some sense,
the true predictors. For that reason, we more accurately refer to the original
attributes as input variables rather than predictor variables for the remainder
of this Article.
In recruitment and hiring, available attributes most often include jobrelevant characteristics such as certifications and prior employers-i.e.,
information that can be drawn from a candidate's resume or application. If it
is being developed by a third party, the training data may include employees
from several different companies. In either case, employers may have the
ability to access or acquire data from other sources on many more attributeswhich may or may not be job related-such as a candidate's social media
profiles, criminal history, and web browsing history. Consequently, the data
sets on which the models are trained may have a very high dimensionality and
include inputs with no obvious connection to job performance. Some may
contain thousands of candidates with thousands of attributes (or more). This
makes algorithmic selection procedures considerably more complex than
aptitude tests and other traditional employee selection tools.
B.

Law of Discrimination

The seminal event in the history of employment discrimination law was
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII4 0 of that statute made it
unlawful for employers to, among other things, "fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
37.

See ANDREW BRUCE & PETER BRUCE, PRACTICAL

STATISTICS

FOR DATA

SCIENTISTS ch. 1 (2017) (ebook) (describing the process of linear regression).
38. See John Villasenor, Artificial Intelligence and Bias: Four Key Challenges,
BROOKINGS:
TECHTANK
(Jan.
3,
2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
techtank/20 19/0 1/03/artificial-intelligence-and-bias-four-key-challenges/
[https://perma.cc/3HMX-ADU3].
39. See id.
40. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2012)).
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employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 4 ' Various other federal statutes have been passed over the
years creating additional protected categories, including age (under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, or ADEA) and disability (under the

Americans with Disabilities Act, or ADA), and many states have their own
antidiscrimination laws covering different or additional protected
categories.42

But more than half of a century after its enactment, Title VII remains the
most prominent antidiscrimination law and has the most fully developed legal
framework for assessing employee selection procedures. Title VII is generally
described as having two basic prohibitions, termed "disparate treatment" and
"disparate impact." 43 The Supreme Court introduced the disparate impact
doctrine in 1971, framing it, in essence, as a logical corollary to the general
bar on discrimination "because of' a protected characteristic. 44 But in the
ensuing decades, courts drew increasingly stark contrasts between the
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of discrimination,4
culminating in a 2009 Supreme Court decision, Ricci v. DeStefano, where the

high court described the inclusion of both theories in Title VII as a "statutory
conflict." 46 Navigating this intersection will be a key challenge for employers
seeking to implement algorithmic selection procedures.

41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
42. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a) (2012) ("It shall
be unlawful for an employer . .. to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age .... "); Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (stating that it is unlawful for an
employer to "discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to
job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."). See
generally Discrimination Employment
Laws,
NCSL
(July
27,
2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/discrimination-employment.aspx
[https://perma.cc/VD6E-W79D] (listing employment discrimination laws from the states).
43. JOSEPH A. SEINER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: PROCEDURE, PRINCIPLES, AND
PRACTICE 80, 170 (2015) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION].
44. See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially

Contested Concept ofEquality, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 2313, 2314 (2006) (citing Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
45. See Rutherglen, supra note 44 ("A strictly chronological account of these
developments would reveal a very checkered history, with decisions to adopt or reject liability
for disparate impact soon followed by qualifications and limitations.").
46. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 580 (2009).
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Disparate Treatment

Title VII's prohibition against disparate treatment derives from the
original text of § 703(a), which prohibits employers from taking any adverse
action

against

an employee

or

characteristic.47 Another provision in

applicant

"because

of'

a protected

§ 703 reinforces this primary prohibition

by stating the following:

Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require
any employer . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or
to any group . .. on account of an imbalance which may exist with
respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 48
These two provisions lie at the core of what became known as disparatetreatment discrimination, although that precise terminology did not become
common until the Supreme Court recognized the disparate impact theory of
discrimination. 49

The vast majority of disparate treatment case law focuses on intentional
acts of discrimination.

Courts generally follow the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework to demonstrate circumstantial evidence of
discriminatory intent-a near necessity in light of the fact that in most
discrimination cases, there is no direct evidence of discriminatory intent. 50
Rare is the case where there is a "smoking gun" demonstrating that the
employer used race or some other characteristic as the explicit justification for
an adverse employment action. The McDonnell Douglas framework allows

plaintiffs to create an inference of intent without such direct evidence of
discriminatory animus. 5 1
But on its face,

§ 703(a) does not actually require an intent to

discriminate; it bars all discrimination made because of a protected
characteristic. 52 The absence of an explicit intent requirement created-and
continues to generate-ambiguity regarding Title VII's scope. 53 The most

43 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).

47.
48.

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note

49.

See Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling DisparateImpact and Disparate Treatment:

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j).

Adapting the CanadianApproach, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 95, 104-05 (2006) [hereinafter
DisentanglingDisparateImpact].
50. See id. at 81, 84-85 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
51. See McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802 (describing the prima facie case that a plaintiff is
required to establish in order to show an inference of intent where direct evidence of
discrimination is lacking).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
53. DisentanglingDisparateImpact, supra note 49, at 96.
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the disparate impact doctrine.
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§ 703(a) was the creation of

DisparateImpact
a.

The Development of the Disparate Impact Doctrine

The standards governing
disparate-impact discrimination are
considerably more complex and ambiguous than those governing disparate
treatment. The Supreme Court first established the disparate impact doctrine
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., a class action by a group of black employees
challenging their employer's requirement that new employees, in all but the
lowest paying departments, have a high school diploma or pass a general
intelligence test.54 Both requirements operated to disproportionately exclude

black workers-an outcome that likely was intended, given that many of the
new requirements were imposed immediately after the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.55 The court of appeals concluded that the education and
intelligence test requirements did not violate Title VII because they were
facially neutral-that is, that they made no express distinction between
employees on the basis of race-and because there was "no showing of a
racial purpose or invidious intent." 56
The Supreme Court reversed with an opinion that reshaped the legal
landscape for employment discrimination law. 57 The Supreme Court began by
rejecting the court of appeals' holding that the absence of intent to
discriminate insulates a facially neutral employment condition under Title
VII:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from
the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to
favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.
Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face,
and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they

54. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 424-28 (1971).
55. Id. at 426-28.
56. Id. at 428-29. Apparently, the court of appeals did not perceive the close proximity
between the enactment of Title VII and the imposition of the new requirements to be evidence
of racially discriminatory intent.
57. Id. at 436.
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operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices. 58

In ruling that the intelligence test and high school diploma requirements
were unlawful, the Griggs court emphasized the systemic disadvantages that
African Americans face as a result of receiving "inferior education in
segregated schools." 59 The Court explained the rationale for its new doctrine
by analogy to one of Aesop's fables:
Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment or
promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the

sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. On the
contrary, Congress has now required that the posture and condition
of the job-seeker be taken into account. It has-to resort again to the
fable-provided that the vessel in which the milk is proffered be one
all seekers can use. The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination
but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation. 60

The Griggs decision also announced what would become known as the
business necessity defense: "The touchstone is business necessity. If an
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to
be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." 61 The Court then
concluded that "neither the high school completion requirement nor the
general intelligence test is shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to
successful performance of the jobs for which it was used." 6 2
Four years after Griggs, the Supreme Court laid out what remains the
basic framework for disparate impact litigation in Albemarle Paper Co. v.

Moody.63 In that case, the Court introduced a three-step rubric for disparateimpact cases that roughly corresponds to the McDonnell Douglas burden-

shifting framework that it had adopted two years earlier for disparate
treatment claims. 64 First, the complaining party must "[make] out a prima
facie case of discrimination, i.e. . . . show[] that the tests in question select
58. Id. at 429-30, 436.
59. Id. at 430 (citing Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 287 (1969)).
60. Id. at 430-31.
61.

Id.; see Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact

Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387, 387 (1996).
62. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31.
63. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-36 (1975).
64. Id. at 425 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-02, 804-05
(1973)).
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applicants for hire promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from
that of the pool of applicants." 65 If a prima facie case is established, the
employer then can rebut by showing that the tests are "job related." 66 Finally,
if the defendant establishes job relatedness, the plaintiff may still prevail by
demonstrating "that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest
in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship."'

67

These three stages of a

disparate impact case are explored further below.
b.

PrimaFacie Case

Albemarle Paper states that a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of
disparate impact by showing "that the tests in question select applicants for
hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the
pool of applicants." 68 The Court did not indicate, however, whether
"significantly different" was intended to be a reference to significance in a
formal statistical sense, or if it instead meant significant in some more
colloquial sense. 69 This ambiguity has led to divergent interpretations of the
nature and magnitude of the disparity necessary to establish a prima facie case
of disparate-impact discrimination.
The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (Guidelines)
adopted the "four-fifths" or "80%" rule, under which:

A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than
four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the
highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement
agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than fourfifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement
agencies as evidence of adverse impact. 70

65. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425.
66. Id.
67. Id.; Albemarle Papermade no mention of the fact that the McDonnellframework was
initially adopted in a case involving an allegation of intentional discrimination in what would
today be termed a disparate treatment case. This further underscores the Court's initial
conception of the disparate impact doctrine as merely a corollary to and not different-in-kind
from-disparate treatment discrimination. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (describing scope of what
Congress proscribed in Title VII).
68. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425.
69. Id.
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2019).
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At first glance, this rule appears to focus exclusively on differences in
selection rates and examines only the magnitude of the differences rather than
their statistical significance. But the Guidelines hedge this rule to the point of
meaninglessness, noting that smaller differences "may nevertheless constitute
adverse impact, where they are significant in both statistical and practical
terms," and that greater differences may not constitute adverse impact "where
the differences are based on small numbers and are not statistically
significant ... ."1 The Guidelines offer no guidance on how enforcement
agencies or the courts should determine whether an adverse impact exists
where the four-fifths rule and a statistical significance test point in opposite
directions.72

Courts have generally shunned the four-fifths rule as a test for prima facie
disparate impact, preferring instead to rely on statistical significance tests. In
Hazelwood School Districtv. UnitedStates, the Supreme Court indicated in a

footnote that a difference of "more than two or three standard deviations"
between the expected and actual number of protected class employees
selected would make "the hypothesis that [employees] were hired without
regard to race . .. suspect." 7 3 In the forty years since Hazelwood, courts have
more often looked to the social science standard of statistical significance at
the 5% level (1.96 standard deviations) than to Hazelwood's less precise "two
or three standard deviation" standard. 74 But no particular statistical method or
threshold has been established as the sine qua non of disparate impact
analysis.
Indeed, many courts have been openly hesitant to rely on statistical
significance alone when attempting to assess adverse impact. Just as the
Guidelines suggest that their four-fifths rule may be disregarded if observed
disparities "are significant in both statistical and practical terms," 7 5 courts
have occasionally sought to inject a requirement of "practical" or "legal"
significance-usually, akin to the four-fifths rule, by looking to the raw
magnitude of the disparity-in addition to statistical significance. 76 But courts
71. Id.
72. See § 1607.4.
73. Id. at 308 n.14 (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 n.17 (1977)).
74. See, e.g., Smithv. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Courts generally
consider [significance at the 5%] level sufficient to warrant an inference of discrimination.");
Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[S]tatistical evidence must meet the 5%
level . . for it alone to establish a prima facie case under Title VII.").
75. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D).
76. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 49 (1st Cir. 2014) (characterizing the
district court's use of the four-fifths rule as an examination of practical significance); Apsley v.
Boeing Co., 691 F.3d 1184, 1199-1201 (10th Cir. 2012). The Apsley court affirmed the district
court's rejection of plaintiff's prima facie disparate impact claim due to a lack of practical
significance. See Apsley, 691 F.3d at 1199-1200. The court also noted that: [T]he
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have reached no consensus on what practical significance entails or even
whether it need be examined at all.
The Supreme Court arguably closed the door on practical significance
requirements in Ricci v. DeStefano, where the Court stated in passing that a
prima facie case of disparate impact requires showing a statistically

significant disparity "and nothing more."7 7 Although this statement is
arguably dicta, it nevertheless suggests that statistical significance tests
remains the primary means by which courts determine whether a prima facie
case of disparate impact discrimination exists. This bodes ill for employers
seeking to leverage Big Data because, as discussed in greater detail below,
large data sets can render even the slightest differences in selection rates
statistically significant, even if they have minimal real-world importance. 78
c.

Business Necessity Defense

Under the amendments to

§ 703 enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,

employers faced with a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination
must "demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity" to escape liability. 79 The
concepts of "job relatedness" and "business necessity" first appeared in
Griggs,80 but in the five decades since, courts, agencies, and Congress alike
have struggled with the meaning, relative importance, and interplay between
the two concepts.Si

Employees' own figures show that the Companies recommended and hired over 99% of the
older employees they would have been expected to recommend and hire in the absence of any
discrimination. While this disparity might still lead a social scientist to suspect that the
divestiture process was not wholly free of age-based discrimination, it would not permit a jury
to find that such discrimination was the Companies' standard operating procedure.
Id. at 1200-01 (first citing Apsley v. Boeing Co., 722 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1239 (D. Kan. 2010);
then citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977); and then citing International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977)).
77. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440, 446 (1982)).
78. See discussion infra Section III.B.1.

79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
80. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 424, 431 (1971).
81. The Principles for the Validation and Use of Personnel Selection
Proceduresprovides an oblique definition of job relatedness by stating how job relatedness must
be shown:
The job relatedness of a selection procedure has been demonstrated when evidence
supports the accuracy of inferences made from scores on, or evaluations derived from,
those procedures regarding some important aspect of work behavior (e.g., quality or
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In Albemarle Paper, the Court described the employer's burden as solely

that of demonstrating job relatedness,

without reference to business

necessity.8 2 But the Supreme Court appeared to return to the concept of

business necessity two years later in Dothardv. Rawlinson, which stated that
"a discriminatory employment practice must be shown to be necessary to safe
and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge" under a
disparate impact theory.83 But courts in the late 1970s and 1980s generally
continued to follow the Albemarle Paper approach, seemingly disregarding

Griggs's description of business necessity as the touchstone of the analysis
and instead focusing on job relatedness. 84 The Supreme Court then attempted
to put the final nail in the business necessity coffin in Wards Cove Packing

Co. v. Atonio.85 There, the Court held that "the dispositive issue is whether a
challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment
goals of the employer" and that "there is no requirement that the challenged
practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business for it to
pass muster."8 6

Just two years later, however, Congress overrode the Supreme Court's
Wards Cove decision in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which enshrined both
job related and business necessity in the text of Title VII. 87 The latter term

appeared not by itself, but instead as part of the phrase "job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity." 88 The statutory
text, like the case law that inspired it, does not clarify how job relatedness
differs (if at all) from business necessity, nor does it indicate how
demonstrating that something is "consistent with business necessity" differs

quantity ofjob performance; performance in training, advancement, tenure, turnover,
or other organizationally pertinent behavior).
SOC'Y FOR INDUS. & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, PRINCIPLES FOR THE VALIDATION AND
USE OF PERSONNEL SELECTION PROCEDURES 4 (5th ed. 2018) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]. This

definition may be adequate for social scientific purposes, but, as described further in the
discussion of validation below, a test must measure a representative set of job behaviors and
outcomes to satisfy the business necessity defense; it does not suffice that a test measures
merely some important aspect of work behavior.
82. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
83. Dothardv. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1977).
84. See LEX K. LARSON, 2 LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 23.04[1]
(2017), LEXIS.
85. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), supersededby statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v.
Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
86. Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 659.
87. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1074 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2012)).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
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(if at all) from demonstrating that it is an actual business necessity. 89 Further,
Congress expressly limited the legislative history that may be used to
elucidate these distinctions. 90
The original source for the pairing of job related with the phrase
consistent with business necessity appears to be the Department of Labor

regulations for federal contractors under the Rehabilitation Act, a predecessor
to the ADA that applied to federal employees and contractors. 91 The relevant
Rehabilitation Act regulations, which predated the Civil Rights Act of 1991
by more than a decade, stated that "to the extent qualification requirements
tend to screen out qualified handicapped individuals," the requirement must
be "job-related . . . and . . . consistent with business necessity and the safe
performance of the job." 92
The same wording that now appears in Title VII also appears, almost

verbatim, in the Americans with Disabilities Act, which Congress enacted a
year before the 1991 amendments to Title VII. 93 Specifically, the ADA
prohibits employers from:
[U]sing qualification standards, employment tests or other selection
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a
disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the
standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity,
is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is
consistent with business necessity.94

89. See id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. § 105(b) ("No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at
Vol. 137 Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered legislative
history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any
provision of this Act that relates to Wards Cove Business necessity/cumulation/alternative
business practice.").
91. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.44(c)(1) (2019); Exec. Order No. 11,758, 39 Fed. Reg. 2,075 (Jan.
15, 1974); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327;
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355.
92. § 60-741.44(c)(1); see also 29 C.F.R. § 32.14(a) (2019) (stating that qualifications for
jobs with programs receiving federal financial assistance must be "related to the performance of
the job and . . . consistent with business necessity and safe performance" if they tend to exclude
individuals with disabilities).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
§ 12101, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2012).
94. § 12112(b)(6) (emphasis added).
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According to case law, 95 ADA regulations, 96 and Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidance, 97 this provision is closely linked
to the ADA's central inquiry into whether an individual can perform the
"essential functions" of a position.
Title VII makes no explicit reference to the essential functions of a job,
and the ADA's linking of essential functions to the business necessity defense
remains mostly foreign to Title VII jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the general
concept-that job relatedness and business necessity require linking the
selection criteria to specific, articulable, and important job functions-is one
of the few common themes pervading the scattershot judicial and
administrative interpretations of Title VII's business necessity defense. 98 The
Guidelines emphasize careful job analysis, with a particular focus on
identifying the "critical or important job duties, work behaviors or work
outcomes." 99 And courts have generally refused to countenance challenged
selection procedures where the employer fails to demonstrate a connection

95. See, e.g., Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 996 (9th Cir. 2007) ("To
show job-relatedness,' an employer must demonstrate that the qualification standard fairly and
accurately measures the individual's actual ability to perform the essential functions of the job.");
EEOC. v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he business necessity
defense . . involves whether the individual can perform the 'essential functions' of the job . .
.").
96. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) (2019) ("[I]f certain criteria are used to screen
out an employee or employees with disabilities as a result of such an examination or inquiry, the
exclusionary criteria must be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and
performance of the essential job functions cannot be accomplished with reasonable
accommodation as required in this part."); 29 C.F.R. § Pt. 1630, app. (2019) ("As part of the
showing that an exclusionary criteria is job-related and consistent with business necessity, the
employer must also demonstrate that there is no reasonable accommodation that will enable the
individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of the job.").
97. See, e.g., EEOC, The Americans With DisabilitiesAct: Applying Performance And
Conduct Standards To Employees With Disabilities, https://www.eeoc.gov/facts/performanceconduct.html [https://perna.cc/NBS4-YECZ] ("If an applicant or employee cannot meet a
specific qualification standard because of a disability, the ADA requires that the employer
demonstrate the importance of the standard by showing that it is job-related and consistent with
business necessity.' This requirement ensures that the qualification standard is a legitimate
measure of an individual's ability to perform an essential function of the specific position the
individual holds or desires."); EEOC, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE
EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS OF THE ADA § 9.4 (1992) ("If a worker has an on-the-job injury
which appears to affect his/her ability to do essential job functions, a medical examination or
inquiry is job-related and consistent with business necessity.").
98. See Bates, 511 F.3d at 996 (describing the relationship between essential functions of
the job and job relatedness); Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d at 875 (stating that essential job functions
are part of the criteria for the "business necessity" defense); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3).
99. § 1607.14(B)(2).
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between the selection procedure and specific, key aspects of job
performance,1 00 a process known as validation.
Establishing the validity of a selection procedure thus is the central task
of employers faced with a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination.
The Supreme Court stated in Griggs that any test or screening mechanism for
job applicants "must measure the person for the job and not the person in the
abstract" to survive a Title VII challenge.101 Albemarle Paperrefined this rule

by casting doubt on the usefulness of generic or subjective measures of
performance to validate selection criteria. 0 2 The Court refused to accept an
employer's attempt to validate its test by showing that the results correlated
with supervisorial ratings, holding that those ratings were "extremely vague
and fatally open to divergent interpretations":
There is no way of knowing precisely what criteria of job
performance the supervisors were considering, whether each of the

supervisors was considering the same criteria or whether, indeed, any
of the supervisors actually applied a focused and stable body of
criteria of any kind. There is, in short, simply no way to determine
whether the criteria actually considered were sufficiently related to
the Company's legitimate interest in job-specific ability to justify a
testing system with a racially discriminatory impact.1 03
Albemarle Papernarrowed the permissible focus of employment tests in

other ways as well, effectively requiring employers to use tests that measure
essential aspects of job performance.1 04 The Court held that employers cannot
use selection procedures that hold applicants to a higher standard than

100. See, e.g., Ernstv. City of Chicago, 837 F.3d 788, 805 (7th Cir. 2016) ("Chicago failed
to establish that its physical-skills entrance test reflects 'important elements of job performance.'
And this lack of connection between real job skills and tested job skills is, in the end, fatal to
Chicago's case.") (quoting EEOC v. Dial Corp., 469 F.3d 735, 743 (8th Cir. 2006)). Federal
courts have at times endorsed, sometimes explicitly, an "essential job functions" interpretation
of Title VII's business necessity defense. Most notably, in Dothardv. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
331-2 (1977), the Supreme Court rejected a prison system's argument that its minimum height
and weight requirements for corrections counselors were job related. The Court acknowledged
that height and weight requirements may "have a relationship to strength, a sufficient but
unspecified amount of which is essential to effective job performance as a correctional
counselor." Id. at 331. But the Supreme Court found this insufficient, noting that the employer
"produced no evidence correlating the height and weight requirements with the requisite amount
of strength thought essentialto goodjob performance." Id. (emphasis added).
101. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
102. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 432-33 (1975).
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 433-34.
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successful people currently in the position by imposing requirements those
current workers could not satisfy.1 05 It also endorsed the contemporary EEOC

guidelines' rule that employers could not test for criteria relevant only to
higher level jobs unless the "job progression structures and seniority
provisions are so established that new employees will probably, within a
reasonable period of time and in a great majority of cases, progress to a higher
level."1 06 The Court reasoned that the flaw in such an approach is that:
The fact that the best of those employees working near the top of a
line of progression score well on a test does not necessarily mean that
that test, or some particular cutoff score on the test, is a permissible
measure of the minimal qualificationsof new workers entering lower

level jobs.107
While never using the term essential functions, the Court implied that the
criteria used to assess job candidates must be based on key aspects of job
performance.1 08
Determining what those key aspects of job performance are-and
demonstrating that the selection process effectively measures them-is the
crux of test validation. The current version of the Standardsfor Educational
and Psychological Testing (Standards) defines validity as "the degree to
which evidence and theory support the interpretations of test scores for

proposed uses of tests."1 09 In the context of employee selection procedures,

105. Id. at 429, 435-36 ("The record shows that a number of white incumbents in highranking job groups could not pass the tests.").
106. Id. at 434 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (c)(1) (2019)). This rule was later incorporated
almost verbatim into the Uniform Guidelines. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(I) (2019).
107. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 434 (emphasis added). The Third Circuit has made a
"minimal qualifications" requirement the crux of its construction of the business necessity
defense, holding that "employers may not use criteria which have a discriminatory effect unless
those criteria define the minimum qualifications necessary to perform the job." NAACP v. N.
Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 477 (3d Cir. 2011). The Uniform Guidelines did
not go quite so far, allowing employers to rely upon tests that measure important components of
job performance. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(B) (2019) ("Evidence of the validity of a test or other
selection procedure by a criterion-related validity study should consist of empirical data
demonstrating that the selection procedure is predictive of or significantly correlated with
important elements of job performance .... Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection
procedure by a content validity study should consist of data showing that the content of the
selection procedure is representative of important aspects of performance on the job .... ").
108. Albemarle Paper,422 U.S. at 433.
109. AM. EDUC. RESEARCH ASS'N ET AL., STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND

PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 11 (4th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). "Theory" is a key element of
this formulation because data-driven algorithms are largely, if not entirely, empirical. Id. As a
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the evidence is the information indicating how well the selection procedure
actually measures the fitness of candidates for that particular job. The theory
is the chain of logic that links the selection procedure to the job requirements.
For example, there is a logical relationship between the requirement that a
programmer be conversant with a particular computer language and the ability
of that candidate to efficiently write code in that language. But no logic or
theory suggests that the car one drives ought to predict a candidate's ability to
succeed as a coder. Consequently, identifying the critical and important
aspects of job performance-as well as metrics that have an evidentiary and
theoretical connection to those aspects of job performance-lies at the heart
of the validation process under the Guidelines." 0
The Guidelines discuss three different types of validity, presenting each
as an independent path through which an employer can establish the job
relatedness of a selection procedure: criterion-related validity, which is based
on correlations between performance on the test and performance on the job
and is by far the validation method most frequently used for employee
selection procedures; content validity, which requires designing a test that
adequately simulates job performance; and construct validity, which is based
on measuring more abstract characteristics that are important for successful
job performance."' Of these, only criterion-related validation represents a
plausible path to establishing the validity of an algorithmic selection
procedure. Content validity is a poor match for most algorithmic selection
tools, which do not attempt to directly test an applicant's job-related
knowledge or ability to perform specific tasks central to the job. The
Guidelines assume that evidence for construct validity will come from
criterion studies;" 2 because the Guidelines also recognize criterion-related
studies alone as a basis for establishing the validity of a test, it rarely is
efficient or even useful for an employer to pursue construct validation (at least
as presented in the Guidelines)" 3 rather than criterion validation.
But even criterion-related validation is an arduous process under the
Guidelines." 4 Moreover, the Guidelines were promulgated in the 1970s" 5 and
reflect half-century-old conceptions both of the nature and format of
result, this raises the question of whether the APA would endorse predictive methods that lack
a theoretical foundation.
110. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.14 B(2), C(4) (2019).
111. § 1607.5(A)-(B).
112. § 1607.14(B)(2)-(3).
113. See discussion infra Section III.A.2. As discussed in greater detail in Section III.A.2,
scientific concept of construct validity has evolved considerably in the decades since the
Guidelines were issued.
114. See discussion infra Section III.A.1.
115. McDaniel et al., supra note 10, at 507.
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employment tests and of what makes a test valid. As discussed further
below,'"6 this makes it difficult to predict how courts and agencies will assess
the validity of algorithmic selection procedures.
d.

Least DiscriminatoryAlternative

"

If an employer meets its burden in establishing the job relatedness of the
selection procedure, the final stage of disparate impact analysis requires a
plaintiff to demonstrate that a less discriminatory alternative was available
that would meet the employer's business needs." 7 This test traces its roots to
Albemarle Paper, which stated that a plaintiff could prevail on a disparate
impact claim by demonstrating "that other tests or selection devices, without
a similar undesirable racial effect, would also serve the8 employer's legitimate
interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship."'
A key question that remains largely unresolved is how effective the
plaintiff's proposed alternative must be to defeat an employer's showing of
business necessity. Albemarle Paper's standard-that the procedure need
only "serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy
workmanship"'-appeared to set the bar rather low, suggesting that the
proposed alternative need not be exactly as effective as the challenged
procedure, so long as it is adequate to meet the employer's needs.1 9 In Wards

Cove, the Supreme Court attempted to reject this low bar, holding that an
alternative practice "must be equally effective as [the employer's] chosen
hiring procedures in achieving

[the employer's] legitimate employment

goals."12 But as with Wards Cove's alteration of the business necessity
defense, Congress overrode the Court through the 1991 amendments to Title
VII.121 In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress explicitly restored the law
governing alternative employment practices to "the law as it existed on June
4, 1984," the day before Wards Cove was decided.1 22

Unfortunately, the exact nature of the "less discriminatory alternative"
standard was far less than clear even before Wards Cove.1 23 The only type of
modification to a selection procedure that seems to have gained wide
recognition as an adequate alternative is the practice of "banding" test scores,
116. See discussion infra Section III.A.1.
117. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (quoting McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
118. See id. (quotingMcDonnell, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
119. Id.
120. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 661 (1989).
121. See id; Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.
122. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (2012).
123. See DisentanglingDisparateImpact, supra note 49, at 103-04.
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where candidates are grouped together in bands based on differences between
scores that are considered insignificant.1 24 Because of the paucity of cases
clarifying the standards by which alternative selection procedures should be
judged, courts have generally been reluctant to decide cases on the basis of a
plaintiff's showing of a less discriminatory alternative.1 25
3.

Ricci v. DeStefano and the Interplay Between Disparate
Treatment and DisparateImpact

While Griggs cast the disparate impact theory as simply a logical
corollary of the disparate treatment that Title VII clearly prohibited, these
legal theories in fact spring from quite separate views on the thrust and
purpose of antidiscrimination laws.

Disparate

treatment, as presently

interpreted, reflects an anticlassification view of discrimination, which holds
that the purpose of antidiscrimination laws is to prohibit classifying or
differentiating between individuals on the basis of a protected
characteristic.1 26 Disparate impact, by contrast, reflects an antisubordination
perspective on discrimination, under which the purpose of such laws is to
"prohibit practices that enforce the social status of oppressed groups and allow
practices that challenge oppression."1 27 The antisubordination roots of
disparate impact theory can be seen in Griggs, where the Supreme Court
emphasized the long-running and systemic disadvantages that blacks had
endured, and rejected the notion that an employment test complies with Title
VII so long as it is "fair in form."1 28

The conceptual tension between disparate treatment and disparate impact
causes practical problems for employers who observe that their policies are
having disparate impacts (or anticipate that they will have a disparate impact
in the future) and perceive that the most logical way to stop such adverse
impacts from arising is to take direct steps to correct for the disparate impact.
But the very act of correcting disparate impacts may itself be a form of

124. See, e.g., Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 979 F.2d 721, 723-24, 728 (9th
Cir. 1992) ("Today we hold that the banding process is valid as a matter of constitutional and
federal law."); Chi. Firefighters Local 2 v. City of Chicago, 249 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2001)
("[Banding is] a universal and normally an unquestioned method of simplifying scoring by
eliminating meaningless gradations.").
125. LARSON, supra note 84, at § 24.02.
126. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights
Tradition:Anticlassification orAntisubordination?,58 U. MIAMIL. REv. 9, 10 (2003).
127. Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination
Law, 63 ALA. L. REv. 955, 961 (2012).
128. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
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disparate treatment.1 29 That dilemma made its way to the Supreme Court in
the 2009 case Ricci v. DeStefano.130
The plaintiffs in Ricci were white and Hispanic firefighters who had taken
and passed an examination administered by the City of New Haven that
determined the firefighters' eligibility for promotion to lieutenant or
captain.13' The City worked with an outside consulting firm to develop the
test over a period of several years. 3 2 But the City's first real-life
administration of the test showed that using the results of the exam would
have an adverse impact on black and Hispanic firefighters; thirty-four of the
seventy-seven firefighters who took the examination were black or Hispanic,
but all ten of the candidates who scored high enough to be considered for
promotion were white.' 33 Based on these disproportionate outcomes, the City
believed that using the results of the test would have an unlawful disparate
impact and subject them to liability under Title VII. 13 Consequently, the City
chose not to certify the examination results.1 35
The firefighters who passed the test challenged the City's decision as
expressly race based, and sought review by the Supreme Court.1 36 The Court
ruled for the firefighters and held that the City's decision, because it was
driven by concern over the adverse impact on minority firefighters, was a
decision made because of race in violation of Title VII's disparate treatment
prohibition:
All the evidence demonstrates that the City chose not to certify the
examination results because of the statistical disparity based on
race-i.e., how minority candidates had performed when compared
to white candidates. As the District Court put it, the City rejected the
test results because "too many whites and not enough minorities
would be promoted were the lists to be certified." Without some other
justification, this express, race-based decision-making violates Title
VII's command that employers cannot take adverse employment
actions because of an individual's race.1 37

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009).
Id.
Id. at 562-63.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 563, 566.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 563, 574-75.
Id. at 579 (citation omitted).
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Notably, the Supreme Court's reasoning did not focus on racial animus
or an intent to discriminate in the usual sense.1 38 On the contrary, the Court
acknowledged that the employer's objective had been avoiding disparateimpact liability-in other words, to avoid committing unlawful
discrimination. 3 9 But that objective did not insulate the employer from
liability because it ignored "the City's conduct in the name of reaching that
objective."1 40 The Court reasoned:
Whatever the City's ultimate aim-however well-intentioned or
benevolent it might have seemed-the City made its employment
decision because of race. The City rejected the test results solely
because the higher scoring candidates were white. The question is not
whether that conduct was discriminatory but whether the City had a
lawful justification for its race-based action.141
The Court rejected the City's argument that its violation of the disparate
treatment prohibition should be excused because the City only did so to avoid
the prospect of disparate impact liability.1 42 But in doing so, the Court

explicitly left open the possibility that an employer, although not the employer
in Ricci itself,1 43 would be able to use the prospect of disparate impact liability
as a defense to a disparate treatment claim.1 44 The Court rejected the plaintiff
firefighters' blanket argument that "avoiding unintentional discrimination
138. Id. at 592.
139. Id. at 579.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 579-80.
142. Id. at 563.
143. As the dissent noted, despite its adoption of the "strong basis in evidence" standard
discussed below, the Ricci majority did not remand the matter for further proceedings so that
evidence could be presented on the strength of a potential business necessity defense and the
availability (or not) of less discriminatory alternative selection procedures. Id. at 563, 631
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Instead, it ruled as a matter of law that plaintiffs were entitled to
summary judgment. Id. at 592. The majority's reasoning implies that it concluded either that
the test was actually valid (which appeared to be a disputed factual question) or presumptively
valid (which runs contrary to the Guidelines and the statute, which places the burden on the
employer to establish validity). Given the absence in the record of criterion-related validity
evidence, the basis of the Court's validity finding is unclear. The Court seemed to imply that
the rigorous job analysis that the City had performed, coupled with its efforts to craft a test based
on that evidence, established the test's validity. That line of reasoning most closely tracks a
content validity argument, but a paper-and-pencil multiple-choice test would not be a direct test
of job performance for a firefighter, as the dissenters in Ricci pointed out. See id. at 634
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
144. See id. at 593. The narrowness of the holding was to the apparent chagrin of Justice
Scalia, who wrote a brief concurrence chiding the Court for declining to confront the
constitutionality of the disparate impact doctrine directly. Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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cannot justify intentional discrimination."1 45 Going a step further, it also
declined to adopt a standard under which "an employer in fact must be in
violation of the disparate-impact provision before it can use compliance as a
defense in a disparate-treatment suit."1

46

Instead, borrowing from the Court's constitutional Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence, the Court held that an employer could escape disparate
treatment liability if it "can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it
not taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate impact
statute."147 The City failed in this regard because it did not adequately
consider evidence of the validity and job relatedness of the test-and job
relatedness is a complete defense to a disparate impact claim.1 48 After
concluding-dubiously, given the case's posture as an appeal from a summary
judgment motion-that the City had failed to make such a "strong basis in
evidence" showing, it ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to summary
judgment and, in effect, ordered that the City certify the examination
results.1 49

At first blush, Ricci seems a very ominous portent for employers
considering whether and how to implement novel selection procedures-and
it certainly is for employers who discover an adverse impact only after a
selection procedure has been designed and administered. Such employers face
a catch-22, where attempting to mitigate the disparate impact could subject
them to disparate treatment liability, while inaction would leave them
vulnerable to a disparate impact claim.' 50 But the Court appeared to leave
open an avenue through which employers could mitigate anticipated disparate
impacts without necessarily violating Title VII.151
Specifically, the Court held that "Title VII does not prohibit an employer
from considering, before administering a test or practice, how to design that
test or practice in order to provide a fair opportunity for all individuals,
regardless of their race." 5 2 Explaining the dissonance between that principle
and the Court's disposition of the firefighters' examination results, the Court
stated:

145. Id. at 580.
146. Id. at 580-81.
147. Id. at 563 (emphasis added).
148. See id. at 578.
149. See id. at 593 (holding that petitioners are entitled to summary judgment and
remanding for further proceedings consistent with the opinion).
150. See id. at 629 (Alito, J., concurring).
151. See id. at 585.
152. Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
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[W]e [do not] question an employer's affirmative efforts to ensure
that all groups have a fair opportunity to apply for promotions and to

participate in the process by which promotions will be made. But
once that process has been established and employers have made
clear their selection criteria, they may not then invalidate the test
results, thus upsetting an employee's legitimate expectation not to be

judged on the basis of race.' 53
The City's actions, according to the Court, fell into the latter category.15 4

The Court emphasized the "high, and justified, expectations of the candidates
who had participated in the testing process on the terms the City had
established for the promotional process," many of whom "had studied for
months, at considerable personal and financial expense."'55 The unfairness of
the City's decision lay not in its desire to avoid using a test that would have a
disparate impact, but in the fact that the City only decided to discard the results
after the examination design process was complete and the promotion
candidates developed something akin to a reliance interest in having the
examination used as a basis for promotion decisions.15 6

The Court's reasoning seems consistent with the text of the most on-point
provision in Title VII,

§ 703(l).15 That provision makes it unlawful for

employers to "adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise
alter the results of, employment related tests" on the basis of protected class
status.1 58 Technically, designing a selection procedure to avoid disparate
impacts would not be adjusting test scores or using different cutoffs because
the scoring rubric for a selection procedure is not yet finalized during the test
design stage.15 9

That said, there is no case law squarely addressing the issue of how much
license employers have to protect against disparate impacts by designing a

selection procedure in a manner that explicitly takes protected class status into
account. Is it permissible for employers to choose a suboptimal selection
device, as measured by its accuracy, because it results in a more diverse
workforce? It is safe to assume that there are limits-not least from § 703(a)'s
general prohibition against making employment decisions because of
protected class status-on the degree to which employers can be race or

153. Id. at 585.
154. Id. at 593.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2() (2012).
158. Id.
159. See id.
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gender conscious when designing a selection procedure.1 60 Using quotas or
granting bonus points on the basis of protected class status, for instance, surely
would not survive a disparate treatment challenge, even if an employer adds
those features as part of initial test design.161 But it is not clear where courts
will draw lines between permissible and impermissible methods of designing
around disparate impacts.
This ambiguity is a source of concern for employees considering
algorithmic selection procedures. 6 2 Algorithms offer the potential for
employers to design a selection procedure that reduce or eliminate disparate
impacts using methods that are far more sophisticated and subtle than the blunt
instruments available for traditional tests.1 63 The degree to which those
methods are deemed consistent with Title VII will likely determine how
quickly employers adopt algorithmic selection procedures in the coming
years.
III. THE UNIQUE CHALLENGES FOR ALGORITHMIC SELECTION TOOLS

Designing algorithmic selection tools that leverage the ability to generate
unique data-driven insights while maintaining legal compliance will prove
challenging under current law. A comprehensive treatment of all the practical
and legal ambiguities surrounding algorithmic selection tools would be
prohibitively lengthy, but sections A through D of Part III identify four
overarching categories that encompass the most vexing legal compliance
issues for algorithmic tools: challenges relating to the validation process;
those stemming from algorithmic tools' reliance on correlation and use of Big
Data; those relating to the opacity of models generated by deep neural
networks; and those stemming from the bare fact that the deployment of
algorithmic tools will provide plaintiffs' lawyers with a clear target for
bringing discrimination claims.
A final issue that starkly illustrates the "square peg in a round hole"
dynamic of algorithmic selection tools and current employment
discrimination law is whether Title VII's disparate treatment doctrine can
even be applied to machines that do not possess conscious intentions-or,
indeed, consciousness at all. As explained in the final section of this part,
despite the intent-focused tilt of case law on disparate treatment, the broad
language of the statutory text and the equally broad early Supreme Court
160. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (discussing unlawful employment
practices for employers based on an "individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
161. See
NAT'L
ARCHIVES,
EEO
Terminology,
https://www.archives.gov/eeo/terminology.html [https://perna.cc/G4DQ-84JA].
162. See ZHANG ET AL., supra note 2, at 8.
163. See id. at 10.
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decisions interpreting it mean that employers are unlikely to escape disparate
treatment liability if they deploy algorithms that make facially discriminatory
classifications.
A.

Validation
1.

The Difficult Path to Criterion-Related Validity Under the

Guidelines
The Guidelines establish rigorous standards for criterion-related
validation studies.1 64 These standards correctly ensure that a selection
procedure has a demonstrable relationship to each job for which it is used, but
the expense and complexity of establishing and maintaining the criterionrelated validity of an algorithmic tool will blunt the efficiency gains that
algorithmic tools promise.1 65
a.

Job Analysis

A criterion-related validation study begins with a careful job analysis
conducted by industrial psychologists or other trained professionals to identify
the critical and important elements of job performance.1 66 Courts emphasize
the thoroughness and attention to detail that a job analysis entails and often
reject validation studies that are not supported by adequate job analyses.1 67
One court described a job analysis: "A thorough survey of the relative
importance of the various skills involved in the job in question and the degree
of competency required in regard to each skill. It is conducted by interviewing
workers, supervisors and administrators; consulting training manuals; and
closely observing the actual performance of the job."1 68

164. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14 (2019) ("The following minimum standards, as
applicable, should be met in conducting a validity study.").
165. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(3) (2019).
166. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(B)(2) (2019); § 1607.14(B)(2).
167. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 432 (1975) ("The study in
this case involved no analysis of the attributes of, or the particular skills needed in, the studied
job groups. There is accordingly no basis for concluding that 'no significant differences' exist
among the lines of progression, or among distinct job groupings within the studied lines of
absence of
progression."); Rogers v. Int'l Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1351 (1975) ("The . .
proper and careful job analyses . . is fatal to the validation study.").
168. Guardians Ass'n of N.Y.C. Police Dep'tv. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 633 F.2d 232,
242 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom, Guardians Ass'n of N.Y.C. Police Dept, v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (quoting Vulcan Soc'y of N.Y.C. Fire Dep't v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n of New York, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 1265, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
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From these observations and information, the experts conducting the
study then "break[] down an observed task into a set of component skills,
abilities and knowledge," and indicate what level of competence or
proficiency is required for each component.1 69 According to the American
Psychological Association's Principles for the Validation and Use of
PersonnelSelection Procedures,which apply the more generally applicable

Standards to the employee selection setting, a proper job analysis "may
include different dimensions or characteristics of work, including work
complexity, environment, context, tasks, behaviors and activities performed,
and worker requirements (e.g., KSAOs [Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and
Other Characteristics] or competencies)." 7 0
b.

Selecting Criteria

From the critical and important job duties, work behaviors, and work
outcomes identified during the job analysis, an employer must then select or
develop measurable criteria that serve as metrics of how well an individual
can perform the key functions of a job.' 7 ' Employees' real-world performance
with respect to those job related criteria then serve as the benchmarks for
validation' 72-and, in the case of algorithmic tools, as target variables for
building a model.
Needless to say, criterion selection is crucial to a proper criterion-related
validity study. "Criteria should be chosen on the basis of work relevance,
freedom from contamination, and reliability rather than availability or
convenience,"73 and "should represent important or critical work behavior(s)
or work outcomes," as identified in the job analysis.? 4 Where courts have
refused to recognize proffered criterion validity studies, it has not usually been
because the employer failed to show the proper correlation between the
selection procedure and the criteria, but because the employer failed to select
proper criteria in the first place. i75

169. See Jones v. N.Y.C. HumanRes. Admin. 391 F. Supp 1064, 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
170. PRINCIPLES, supra note 81, at 1, 7.
171. See id. at 7.
172. See id. at 10.
173. Id. at 11.
174. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(3) (2019).
175. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 432-34 (1975) (stating that Albemarle
Paper failed to show that its testing was job related when the criteria were subjective); see also,
e.g., Green v. U.S. Steel Corp., 570 F. Supp. 254, 273-77 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (stating that the hiring
standard U.S. Steel adopted was a series of subjective criteria and found that because the
employer failed to rebut plaintiffs' prima facie case of disparate impact, the plaintiffs were
entitled to judgment in their favor).
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As a threshold matter, the criteria must be direct measures of job
performance, and not separate on-the-job tests or assessments that have not
themselves been validated. 7 6 Courts generally expect criteria to be specific
and reasonably objective markers of job performance and frown on criteria
that are vague, generic, or subjective. In Albemarle Paper, the Supreme Court

found a purported criterion validity study inadequate in large part because the
criteria consisted of subjective supervisory employee rankings thatwere made
according to "a 'standard' that was extremely vague and fatally open to
divergent

interpretations."17 7

Consequently,

supervisory

ratings

and

assessments-which are often the only available measures of an employee's
on-the-job performance-may not be adequate to support criterion-related
validity.17 8

But it is difficult, and often impossible, to capture all essential and
important job behaviors and job outcomes using readily available data. More
general signals of employee performance such as statistics on hiring,
retention, and tenure are generally available to employers. Formal
performance reviews in some form may also be available, but if these include
narrative sections or are not subject to a uniform rubric that ensures the
reviews have consistent meaning, the reliability of the reviews (and the ability
of an algorithm to make sense of them) as target variables might be limited.
Some jobs may have reasonably reliable performance metrics that seem
to capture the essence of the job. But a closer examination often reveals that
available metrics do not adequately measure job performance. 179 For example,
a district attorney's office may track the number of cases that its prosecutors
try and the percentage of cases they win. These statistics, which can be tracked
reliably at little or no cost, may make attractive target variables. But a
prosecutor's win-loss record may be a poor indicator of the quality of their
lawyering. The best prosecutors might be the ones who take on the most
difficult and time-intensive cases, and thus try fewer cases and have a lower
176. Ernstv. City of Chicago, 837 F.3d 788, 802 (7th Cir. 2016) ("Chicago created a skills
test and a work-sample test, found a strong correlation between the skills test and the worksample test, and thus concluded that the skills test is a good measure of job-related skills. As the
plaintiffs argue, this is a statistical form of self-affirmation. There is no evidence that the worksample test, which Chicago used to validate the skills test, is a proper validation of job skills.").
177. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 432-33; see also, e.g., Green, 570 F. Supp. at 275-76
(discussing subjective hiring criteria). In Green, the court struck down a company's "'best
qualified' hiring standard," which "consist[ed] of about twenty subjective criteria applied as an
'amalgam,"' and where evidence showed that "each individual decision-maker essentially
simply consulted his or her 'gut level' reaction to an individual applicant." Green, 570 F. Supp.
at 275-76.
178. See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 432-33.
179. Dick Grote, The Myth of Performance Metrics, HARv. BUS. REV. (Sept. 12, 2011),
https://hbr.org/2011/09/the-myth-of-performance-metric [https://perma.cc/RZ7R-HW7W].
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rate of positive outcomes than less skilled lawyers who shy away from such
cases. But if the district attorney lacks the resources to closely observe the
work of most prosecutors, the flawed trial statistics may be the only metrics
available.180
Similarly, employers are often tempted to search for readily observable
characteristics that can serve as proxies for attributes essential to the job in
question. But this too carries risk. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, an employer

attempted to justify its minimum requirements for height and weight-metrics
that were readily available-on the claimed basis that those requirements
were meant to ensure that corrections counselors had the requisite physical
strength, which was the job-relevant attribute of interest.181 The Court rejected
this argument, reasoning that "[i]f the job-related quality that the appellants
identify is bona fide, their purpose could be achieved by adopting and
validating a test for applicants that measures strength directly." 8 2
Having a representative set of participants is another key requirement for

criterion-related validation. 83 The subjects must broadly reflect of the
characteristics of the pool of actual applicants. 84 Thus, the sample must
consist of entry-level employees if it is for an entry-leveljob; using employees
from higher in the line of progression is not sufficient. 85 Representativeness
across protected classifications is also required; the Guidelines state that the
sample "should insofar as feasible include the races, sexes, and ethnic groups
normally available in the relevant job market."1 8 6 Ultimately, an employer
establishes criterion validity under the Guidelines by demonstrating that
performance on the selection procedure correlates with a representative set of
performance measures tied to the job criteria identified during the job
analysis.1 87

As the above discussion suggests, a proper criterion-related validity study
is a major undertaking even for large and sophisticated employers. This may
explain, in part, why most employers have shied

away from using

180. The tendency to turn to easily available metrics as a substitute for deeper analysis is
hardly unique to the hiring process. Before the recent explosion in sports analytics, Michael
Lewis observed that "[f]or most of its history basketball has measured not so much what is
important as what is easy to measure points, rebounds, assists, steals, blocked shots and these
measurements have warped perceptions of the game." Michael Lewis, The No-Stats All-Star,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 13, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/magazine/15Battiert.html [https://penna.cc/9LTB-ZRS7].
181. Dothardv. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977).
182. Id. at 332.
183. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(1) (2019).
184. Id.
185. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 434 (1975).
186. § 1607.14(B)(4).
187. § 1607.14(B)(2)-(3).
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employment tests altogether;' 88 relying on human judgment, however flawed,
generates neither the cost nor the discoverable paper trail that validation
entails.
Because many employers wishing to deploy an algorithmic selection
procedure will not have ready access to a properly developed set of criteria
that can serve as the basis for a criterion-related validity study, the process of
developing and validating an algorithmic tool may take several years. That
timetable that may prove problematic given the vintage of the Guidelines and
the likelihood that courts and agencies will introduce new standards for
validation in the coming years.
2.

The Guidelines: Behind the Times

The long and difficult process of criterion-related validation under the
Guidelines will be challenging enough for employers testing new hiring tools.
But the Guidelines' forty-year-old standards are overdue for revamping or
replacement to bring them in line with the modern social science of test
validity, which has evolved considerably in the decades since the Guidelines
first appeared. This adds an additional layer of legal uncertainty.
The EEOC and four other federal agencies and departments1 89 jointly
adopted the Guidelines in 1978. Recognizing that theories of test validity were
still evolving, the Guidelines state that "[n]ew strategies for showing the
validity of selection procedures will be evaluated as they become accepted by
the psychological profession."1 90 But the Guidelines' validation standards
have, in fact, remained unchanged in the four decades since their
promulgation. In the interim, the American Psychological Association (APA)
has issued revised versions of the Standards three times (in 1985, 1999, and
2014). Starting with the 1985 edition, the Standards moved away from the

Guidelines' trichotomous separation of test validity into content, criterion, and
construct validity.191 Consequently, even before the advent of Big Data and
the prospect of completely new types of employee selection procedures, many

of the Guidelines' provisions and much of their terminology seemed dated.
Comparing the descriptions of construct validity in the Guidelines with
those in modern scientific literature provides a stark example of how much
the social science of test validation has evolved since the Guidelines were
188. See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
189. These federal agencies and departments include the Office of Personnel Management,
Department of Justice, Treasury Department, and the Department of Labor's Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2(A) (2019).
190. § 1607.5(A).
191. See Samuel Messick, Validity, in EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT 13, 18-20 (Robert
L. Linn ed., 3d ed. 1989).
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issued. The Guidelines refer to construct validity as "a relatively new and
developing procedure in the employment field," for which there was, as of
1978, "a lack of substantial literature extending the concept to employment
practices."1 92 But the literature surrounding construct validity developed
rapidly in the 1980s and 90s; today, far from an undeveloped and novel theory,
construct validity is generally recognized as the overarching validity
concept.1 93 Where the Guidelines present construct and content validity as
separate types of validity, modern social science treats test content and
criterion relatedness as categories of evidence for demonstrating the broader
concept of test validity.1 94

Modern test literature treats test bias and fairness as potential threats to
validity, and the vocabulary surrounding what constitutes test bias reliessometimes explicitly-on the concept of the constructs that represent
whatever the selection procedure is ultimately attempting to measure.1 95 One
specific threat to validity extensively studied by modern social scientistsconstruct-irrelevant variance-will take on particular importance in the age of
Big Data and with the rise of algorithmic selection procedures, as discussed
further below.1 96 But the Guidelines and the existing case law on validation
are bereft of meaningful discussion of these threats to validity, leaving
employers to guess if, when, and how courts and agencies will take them in
into account.

Many courts continue to cite the Guidelines when discussing proper
validation methods, and the EEOC's Fact Sheet on Employment Tests and
Selection Procedures still references the Guidelines as the primary source of
regulatory guidance on validation of selection procedures.1 97 Employers
seeking to implement algorithmic selection procedures thus have little choice
but to pursue validation that complies with the Guidelines. But the stringent
requirements for criterion validation under the Guidelines can take many
years to complete. The law may well change in the interim, which makes
reliance on the Guidelines' validity standards an inherently unstable
proposition as long as they lag decades behind the prevailing social science.
192. § 1607.14(D)(1).
193. See, e.g., WILLAM M. TROCHIM ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS 128-30 (2d ed. 2015);
AM. EDUC. RESEARCH ASS'N ET AL., supra note 109, at 11 ("The term construct is used in the
Standardsto refer to the concept or characteristic that a test is designed to measure."). But see
Jerry A. Colliver et al., From Test Validity to Construct Validity... and Back?, 46 MED. EDUC.
366, 367-70 (2012) (criticizing the increasingly broad use of construct validity despite its rising
popularity in social science).
194. AM. EDUC. RESEARCH ASS'N ET AL., supra note 109, at 14-19.
195. Id. at 5 ("Fairness and accessibility, the unobstructed opportunity for all examinees
to demonstrate their standing on the construct(s) being measured, are relevant for valid score
interpretations for all individuals and subgroups in the intended population of test takers.").
196. See discussion infra Section III.B.2.
197. § 1607.14(B)(3).
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The Pitfalls of Correlationsand Big Data

The sheer size of data sets in the era of Big Data deepens the challenges
that employers, agencies, and courts will face when attempting to analyze
whether a particular algorithmic selection tool is legally compliant. Some of
these challenges relate to algorithmic and data-driven selection tools' reliance
on correlation rather than causation. In some ways, using correlative
techniques across a huge number of attributes allows for a richer and more
holistic analysis of candidates. But correlative techniques fit awkwardly (if at
all) with existing legal frameworks, many of which-including
antidiscrimination laws-rest on cause-and-effect relationships.1 98 Reliance
on correlation alone is also discouraged in modern test validity theory. This
could complicate efforts to validate selection procedures that have an adverse
impact. 199
A related challenge is that even fairly small gaps in selection rates will be
statistically significant given a sufficiently large number of observations. The
large number of attributes stored regarding candidates introduces additional
dangers, most notably that the risks of construct-irrelevant variance and
redundant encoding of protected class status, explained below, increase with
the dimensionality of a data set.
1.

The Ubiquity and Meaninglessness of StatisticalSignificance in
Large Data Sets

If an employer uses an algorithmic tool to assess hundreds or thousands
of candidates, rejected candidates who sue may find that the bar for making
out a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination under current law is
remarkably low. Recall that the primary inquiry for prima facie disparate
impact focuses on the differences in the rates at which members of protected
class groups are selected, and that courts have most often focused on whether
those differences are statistically significant. 20 0 For selection procedures that

are used on a few dozen candidates, the magnitude of the difference required
for statistical significance is fairly large.
But, all else being equal, the magnitude of the difference necessary for
statistical significance diminishes as the number of observations in a data set
increases. If a data set has thousands of observations, even very small
differences-say a 0.5% difference in selection rates between men and
198. See Allan G. King & Marko Mrkonich, "Big Data" and the Risk of Employment
Discrimination, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 555, 563 (2016).
199. Id.
200. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.b.
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women-may nevertheless be statistically significant. Under some
interpretations of current law, such a statistically significant difference may,
'

by itself, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. 20
Consider the First Circuit's 2014 decision in Jones v. City of Boston. 20 2

In that case, the First Circuit reversed a district court decision that had relied
on the four-fifths rule in granting summary judgment to an employer, with the

circuit court holding that the four-fifths rule cannot be used to "trump a
showing of statistical significance," particularly in cases with a large sample
size. 20 3 Indeed, the court ultimately rejected the notion of an additional
"practical significance" requirement for prima facie disparate impact

altogether, finding that "any theoretical benefits of inquiring as to practical
significance outweighed by the difficulty of doing so in practice in any
principled and predictable manner." 20 4

Employers seeking to leverage the power of Big Data at scale must either
hope for a change in the prevailing winds of case law, or else find ways of
eliminating statistically significant disparities between protected groups. But

it may be devilishly difficult to reduce differences in selection rates to
statistically insignificant levels without using techniques that make direct
adjustments on the basis of protected characteristics-a technique that could
constitute disparate treatment discrimination. 205 Also, even if a selection
procedure were designed and confirmed to have no disparate impacts during
testing, disparate impacts may arise over time if the characteristics of the
applicant pool diverge from the characteristics of the candidates in the training
data. Current case law provides no clear guidance on whether making
additional adjustments to the algorithm to reduce such later arising disparate
impacts would constitute disparate treatment.
2.

Construct-Irrelevant Variance and Construct
Underrepresentation

The large number of attributes that are available in the age of Big Data
will also present novel challenges as courts, agencies, and employers attempt
to assess what a business necessity defense might look like in the context of
algorithmic tools. A high-dimensionality data set presents an increased risk of
construct-irrelevant variance, that is, nonrandom differences in test results that
201. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 447 U.S.
440, 446 (1982)) ("[A] prima facie case of disparate-impact liability [is] essentially, a threshold
showing of a statistical disparity . . . and nothing more.").
202. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2014).
203. Id. at 46, 49, 52-53.
204. Id. at 53.
205. See discussion infra Sections III.E, IV.C.
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are the result of factors unrelated to the intended construct. 206 This can happen
for a variety of reasons, including when a criterion or predictor measures
something more or different than the target construct (e.g., if the scores on a
mathematical aptitude test are affected by a test-taker's proficiency in written
English); or when scores reflect cultural differences rather than (or in addition
to) differences in job related competencies. The inverse of construct-irrelevant
variance is construct underrepresentation or construct deficiency. 207 This
occurs when criterion measures or predictors fail to reflect construct-relevant
sources of variance because the criteria or predictors are unrepresentative or
otherwise do not capture important aspects of the target construct. 208 Both

construct-irrelevant variance and construct deficiency can generate adverse
impacts if members of certain subgroups perform differently on the
improperly included or excluded aspects of job performance. 209
The manner in which predictors and the test sample are selected in an
algorithmic selection tool creates a risk of construct deficiency and introduces
a potential source of construct-irrelevant variance in addition to those that
affect traditional employment tests. According to modern test validation
literature, the proper method for selecting predictors involves not just
searching for statistical relationships between predictors and criteria, but also
examining whether there are theoretical and logical reasons to suppose that
the predictors are related to the criterion-in other words, that they are related
in more than a mere correlational sense.2 10
This was not a major issue for the sorts of employee selection procedures
that existed at the time the Guidelines were promulgated because having a
conceptual basis for predictor selection is a practical necessity for paper-and206. See AM. EDUC. RESEARCH ASS'N ET AL., supra note 109, at 12-13; Messick, supra
note 191, at 34.
207. See AM. EDUC. RESEARCH ASS'N ET AL., supra note 109, at 12-13; Messick, supra
note 191, at 34.
208. See AM. EDUC. RESEARCH ASS'N ET AL., supra note 109, at 12-13; Messick, supra
note 191, at 34; PRINCIPLES, supra note 81, at 11-12.
209. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 81, at 11-12.
210. See, e.g., Messick, supra note 191, at 17 ("[E]mpirical relationships between the
predictor scores and criterion measures should make theoretical sense in terms of what the
predictor test is interpreted to measure and what the criterion is presumed to embody . . [E]ven
for purposes of applied decision making, reliance on criterion validity or content coverage is not
enough. The meaning of the measure, and hence its construct validity, must always be pursued
.... "); PRINCIPLES, supra note 81, at 12 ("The rationale for a choice of predictor(s) should be
specified. A predictor is more likely to provide evidence of validity if there is good reason or
theory to suppose that a relationship exists between it and the behavior it is designed to predict.
A clear understanding of the work (e.g., via results of a work analysis), the research literature,
or the logic of predictor development provides this rationale. This principle is not intended to
rule out the application of serendipitous findings, but such findings, especially if based on small
research samples, should be verified through replication with an independent sample.").
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pencil employment tests; it would be inefficient, to say the least, for the
developers of such a test to provide a sample of hundreds or thousands of
random questions to current employees and blindly search the results to see
which questions correlate with performance on the criterion measures of
interest. Instead, the designers of traditional employment tests select or
develop questions because they have a prior reason to believe that there is a
relationship between the proposed test questions and the criterion of interest.
Choosing predictors based on their theoretical relationship with the target
construct thereby allows test designers to be alert to potential sources of
construct-irrelevant variance and to ensure that the test is measuring a
sufficiently representative set of job related criteria. The hypothesized
relationship between predictors and criteria is then tested by analyzing the
results of the validation study to see if the test responses correlate with the
criterion measures. 211

But the algorithms that drive ML-based selection procedures do not
consider theoretical or logical relationships between variables, or whether the
training data includes attributes that constitute a representative set of
predictors. The training algorithm instead examines numerous individual
attributes and combinations of the attributes available in the training data and
then develops a model based on correlations with the criterion measureswithout regard to whether there was a prior reason to suppose that the
attributes would have predictive value with respect to the criterion. This is
both a blessing and a curse. It is a blessing because it has the potential to
unearth job related predictors that would not have been obvious to humans.
But it also creates a heightened risk that an algorithm will discover and
capitalize on chance correlations. 212 That risk that is heightened further when
data sets contain a large number of observations (because small differences
can constitute statistically significant correlations given a large enough
sample size) or attributes (because more attributes also means more
opportunities for chance correlations).
In the science world, the tendency of algorithmic tools-particularly
those that utilize deep learning-to "discover" chance correlations is already
211. Cf AM. EDUC. RESEARCH ASS'N ET AL., supra note 109, at 17 ("[T]he test is not a
measure of a criterion, but rather is a measure hypothesized as a potential predictor of that
targeted criterion. Whether a test predicts a given criterion in a given context is a testable
hypothesis.").
212. PRINCIPLES, supra note 81, at 13 ("In cases where scores from .... algorithms are
used as part of the selection process, the conceptual and methodological basis for that use should
be sufficiently documented to establish a clear rationale for linking the resulting scores to the
criterion constructs of interest. In addition, when some form of empirical keying is used, clear
evidence of cross-validity should be provided prior to operational use to guard against
empirically driven algorithms' propensity to capitalize on chance.").
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causing a "reproducibility crisis," in the words of Rice University statistician
Dr. Genevera Allen. 213 Allen discovered in her research several instances
where scientists using deep learning algorithms claimed to have identified
previously unknown associations between variables, only to find that other
researchers were unable to reproduce the results when applying the same
techniques to different data sets. 214 They discovered associations between
variables that existed only in the particular samples available to the
researchers, but those associations had no generality because these
correlations were absent from different sets of similar data.215
Similar phenomena pose a substantial threat to validity for users of
algorithmic employee selection tools. First, as with the genomic and health
research that was the focus of Allen's study, 2 16 there is a risk that algorithmic
selection tools will discover correlations between variables in the training data
that do not actually exist in the broader real-world applicant pool. While
machine learning offers a number of well-accepted techniques for crossvalidation, those methods may not be adequate to weed out all of the
construct-irrelevant associations between variables in large data sets,
particularly if a data set contains information on thousands (or tens or
hundreds of thousands) of attributes.
There is another type of correlation that can also afflict employee
selection procedures-associations between attributes that do hold in the
population at large but that are nevertheless construct irrelevant. The number
of such correlations may increase if the training examples tend to come from
individuals from the same demographic group or groups, and who therefore
share non-job-related attributes in the data. For example, if musical tastes
differ by race, and the best incumbent job performers for a particular position
are predominantly from a given race, then a high correlation between musical
taste and job performance may exist-but only due to demographics, and not
because musical taste is an accurate and generalizable predictor of job
performance. The less representative the training data are of the population at
large, the higher the risk that a deep learning model will identify and create a
model that relies upon such demographics-dependent correlations.
213. Pallab Ghosh, AAAS: Machine Learning 'Causing Science Crisis', BBC (Feb. 16,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-47267081
[https://penna.cc/VT3HKQHW].
214. Id.
215. Id. The Principlesallude to this potential problem when discussing validation in the
context of algorithmic selection procedures. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 81, at 13 ("[W]hen
some form of empirical keying is used, clear evidence of cross-validity should be provided prior
to operational use to guard against empirically driven algorithms' propensity to capitalize on
chance.").
216. See Ghosh, supra note 213.
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An example of this phenomenon can be seen in the results of the MIT
Media Lab Gender Shades study. 217 That study examined the accuracy of
gender classification systems-that is, machine learning software that takes a
photograph of a person as its input and outputs a predicted classification of
that person's gender as male or female. 21 The MIT study used the gender

classification systems on photographs of Northern European and African
politicians. 219 The study showed that each of the three facial recognition
platforms was more accurate in classifying the European legislators than their
African counterparts. 220 Not only that; the study also indicated that the
accuracy of the tool was generally better for people with skin types typically
associated with moderately dark skin than those with very dark skin. 221

The authors hypothesized that this may be because darker skinned
individuals may have been "less represented in the training data." 222 If so, the
tool's accuracy might have been diminished either because of the dissimilarity
of darker subjects' skin from those that dominated the training data set or
because darker skin may be highly correlated with other gender-distinctive
attributes that were also underrepresented in the training data. 223 The tool may
thus have learned attributes useful for distinguishing white males and white
females, while devaluing gender-distinctive attributes present in individuals
with darker skin, and underweighting those attributes that actually are useful
predictors across the population as a whole.
This is an illustration of a broader challenge with correlation-based
selection: the more dissimilar an individual is from the population that served
as training examples, the less reliable the tool's output will be for that
individual. That could lead to undesirable-and perhaps unlawful-outcomes
with algorithmic employee selection tools. 224 In the employment setting, if the
positive examples used in the training data are predominantly individuals with
a certain set of protected class characteristics, the data may tell the tool that

&

217. JOY BUOLAMWINI & TIMNIT GEBRU, GENDER SHADES: INTERSECTIONAL
ACCURACY DISPARITIES IN COMMERCIAL GENDER CLASSIFICATION (Sorelle A. Friedler

Christo Wilson eds., 2018).
218. Id. at 1.
219. Id. at 5.
220. Idat 8, 10.
221. Id. at 7 (noting the difference in the distributions of lighter and darker skinned
subjects, labeled according to the Fitzpatrick classification system).
222. Id. at 10.
223. See id.
224. Among psychologists, the term "subgroup validity" refers to the different validity
coefficients that can arise between tested subgroups, and the differences in those coefficients are
termed "differential validity." See Richard J. Klimoski & Lori B. Zukin, Psychological
Assessment in Industrial/OrganizationalSettings, in 10 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY:
ASSESSMENT PSYCHOLOGY 317, 324 (Irving B. Weiner ed. 2003). The issue of differential
validity is discussed further in Section IV.C.1.
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those individuals' attributes-whether construct-relevant or not-are
associated with success for the position in question. The more highly qualified
candidates' attributes differ from the training benchmarks, the more the
algorithm's ability to identify those candidates would diminish.
As an example, say that a company was training an algorithmic tool to
recognize good software engineers using training data that reflects the
demographics of their best current network engineers, who are predominantly
white males. If these employees share, as is likely, construct-irrelevant
characteristics that are reflected in the training data, the tool will learn to
associate those characteristics with good job performance. This could have
two related adverse impacts on qualified candidates who are not white males.
First, if the ablest female and nonwhite candidates have attributes (whether
construct-relevant or not) that differ from those of the white males who
dominate the current sample, the tool's accuracy will be lower when scoring
those candidates, just as the gender classification programs in the MIT study
were less accurate when attempting to classify individuals with darker skin.
Second, the individuals that the tool identifies as the best candidates from the
underrepresented groups may have scored highly not because of
characteristics that affect their actual competence, but because of the
construct-irrelevant characteristics they share with the current software
engineers.

Both of those factors may drive down the number of qualified female and
minority candidates that the tool selects. In addition, the candidates who the
tool does recommend from the disadvantaged group are less likely to be the
most competent candidates from that group, which may reduce the likelihood
that they are ultimately hired and retained. Through these mechanisms, an
employer's adoption of an algorithmic tool could inadvertently reinforce
existing demographics.

If courts and agencies reassess the legal standards of employee selection
procedures to bring them in line with modern scientific standards, the
resulting new standards will likely include a requirement that an employer
demonstrate some level of construct relevance-as opposed to relevance in
the correlational sense-for algorithmic selection procedures. In either case,
employers may find conducting a legally compliant validation cumbersome at
best and infeasible at worst, given the sheer number of attributes that would
need to be reviewed. The task would be doubly challenging in the context of
a deep learning tool, which may transform the input variables into
representations that are not human interpretable. 225 Because courts have never

ruled on the requirements of validity studies in the context of algorithmic
selection procedures that utilize thousands of features, it simply is not clear

225. See discussion infra Section III.C.
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how courts will treat such tools if they produce a disparate impact and the
employer is unable to explain how and why the variables considered and
constructed by the tool were relevant to the job in question.
3.

Redundant Encodings

On the surface, it may seem easy for the developer of an algorithmic
selection tool to design around disparate treatment-simply ensure that
gender, race, and other protected class status information is not made available
to the selection tool during training. But in the age of Big Data, it may not be
that simple. First, it may be difficult to reliably excise protected class status
information if the training data pools information on candidates from a variety
of sources, each of which may encode the sensitive characteristic differently.
Even if employers overcome that hurdle, however, a tool trained on data sets
of high dimensionality could effectively reconstruct a protected characteristic
from other attributes with which it is correlated, a problem called redundant
encoding. 226 When that occurs, the redundant encoding effectively creates a
reliable proxy for the protected characteristic, even if it does not use the
characteristic itself 227
If the tool is able to reconstruct the protected characteristic, has the tool
engaged in disparate treatment? Or does the fact that it did not explicitly
consider the candidate's gender mean that the redundant encoding is facially
neutral, such that disparate impact provides the proper analytical rubric?
Unsurprisingly, this issue is not addressed in antidiscrimination case law,
meaning that courts and agencies will have to decide which rubric to use when
faced with redundant encodings.
Say that redundant encoding allows the algorithm to reconstruct a
person's sex with 99.9% accuracy-say, by using the candidate's height,
weight, college attended, and recent clothing purchases-and uses the
resulting proxy for sex as part of the model. If the model then systematically
disfavors women, women may plausibly argue that they were rejected because
of their sex. Such a ruling would be consistent with the prevailing trend in
case law, under which courts have increasingly held that, because Title VII
prohibits discrimination because of sex, the prohibition against disparate
treatment covers "not just discrimination based on sex itself, but also
discrimination based on traits that are a function of sex." 228 Thus, courts have
226. See CYNTHIA DWORK ET AL., FAIRNESS THROUGH AWARENESS 22 (2011).

227. Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data'sDisparateImpact, 104 CAL. L. REV.
671, 695 (2016).
228. Zardav. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2018); see also Hively
v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 339 (7th Cir. 2017). See generally Mary Stuart King,
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held that using attributes related to sex, such as life expectancy, 229
conformance to gender norms, 230 and sexual preference 23 1 constitutes
disparate treatment.
But it is not clear how far disparate treatment liability may extend when
the discrimination is based on proxy characteristics. One court attempted to
draw a distinction between characteristics that are a "proxy" for a protected
characteristic and those that merely "correlate" with it. 23 2 But it is unclear
where the line between proxy and correlate lies. It is difficult to imagine a
court countenancing a model that uses a predictor variable that perfectly
correlates with a protected characteristic. But what about a predictor variable
with an R-squared value of 0.99 with respect to the protected characteristic?
Or 0.8? Or 0.5? Until these questions are resolved, employers cannot afford
to assume that they can insulate themselves from disparate treatment liability
risk simply by removing demographic data and related information from the
training data. 233

C.

The Black Box Problem

Perhaps the issue that legal commentators raise most frequently when
discussing algorithmic selection tools is the black box problem-that is, that
it may be difficult or impossible for a human to reconstruct or interpret the
logical steps that the tool took when assessing the fitness of a candidate for a
particular job. In this way, ML-powered selection tools share much in
common with human decision makers, whose reasoning behind a particular
selection decision may not be apparent to outside observers. But human
Note, To Protect or Not to Protect: An EmpiricalApproach to Predicting Where the Fourth

Circuit Would Stand on Coveragefor Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Title VII, 705
S.C. L. REv. 1075, 1076-80 (discussing the expansion and development of Title VII in regards
to sex as a protected class).
229. See City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978)
(finding Title VII violation where employer "require[d] 2,000 individuals to contribute more
money into a fund than 10,000 other employees simply because each of them is a woman, rather
than a man," even though contributions were based on observed actuarial differences between
the sexes in longevity).
230. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51
(1989)).
231. Id. at 113-15.
232. Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 563 F. Supp. 2d 508, 517-18 (D.N.J.
2008).
233. Even if the effect of redundant encodings was subject only to disparate impact
analysis, the presence of redundant encodings would still pose liability risks to employers. The
presence of such encodings could lead to gaps in selection rates for protected groups. And if the
attributes that generated the redundant encodings are construct-irrelevant, an employer would
likely be unable to establish a business necessity defense.
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decision makers can be put on the witness stand and forced to explain their
reasoning. Their underlying motivations for a particular decision may also be
illuminated by other evidence, such as emails, text messages, conversations
with friends, and social media activity. Machines are, for now at least, not able
to testify regarding their decisions, and because ML algorithms are effectively
built on the closed universe of their training data, little other evidence will
likely be available that could shed light on how an algorithmic selection tool
arrived at a particular score or recommendation for a particular candidate.
With the rise of deep learning, this inscrutability is not simply a problem
for plaintiffs and courts. One result of the complexity of deep neural networks
is that the precise inner workings of an algorithm may be indecipherable even
to the algorithm's designers. 23 4 While Title VII does not prohibit opaque
selection procedures per se, the potential opacity of algorithmic tools will
present considerable practical challenges for both plaintiffs and employers in
discrimination suits based on the use of such tools once adverse impact is
established.
For example, consider what would happen if redundant encodings of
protected characteristics allowed algorithmic tools to essentially reconstruct
the protected characteristics themselves, with discriminatory effects on certain
protected groups. Regardless of whether courts characterize any resulting
discrimination as disparate treatment or disparate impact, the employer may

have difficulty deciphering whether-much less how-redundant encoding
arose. This would complicate both efforts to rectify the discrimination and
preparation of an adequate legal defense.
Of course, plaintiffs would have difficulty determining how the
discriminatory output had been generated as well. In a disparate impact case,
plaintiffs are responsible for identifying the subset of attributes responsible
for the redundant coding, unless they can prove the attributes are "not capable
of separation for analysis." 235 That may seem to suggest that employers who
use such systems may escape liability for discrimination. But if the tool is as
opaque to the employer as it is to the employee, it is difficult to predict
whether employers or employees will suffer the greater disadvantage from the
tool's opacity.

If courts view the discrimination through a disparate impact lens, the
employer would seem to be at a greater strategic disadvantage than the
plaintiff. Because the final output of the tool is not a black box, a plaintiff
would have little difficulty determining whether the ultimate effect of the tool
234. See generally Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart ofAl, MIT TECHNOLOGY
(Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-theheart-of-ai/ [https://penna.cc/F249-2N9D] (discussing the difficulty in assessing results from Al
technology).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
REVIEW

Published by Scholar Commons,

45

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 2 [], Art. 9
494

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 71: 449]

was to disproportionately disfavor a protected class, as necessary to establish
a prima facie case. On the other hand, the employer's efforts to establish the
validity of the procedure would be complicated by the impracticability of
tracing the neural network's transformation of the original input attributes into
the final parameters used by the model. This is particularly true if courts
require validation of the individual components of an algorithmic selection
procedure. In such a situation, the employer might find itself hamstrung by its
inability to identify and validate the components of the model that are having
an adverse impact. This problem becomes even more serious-and perhaps
intractable-if an algorithmic tool is updated frequently or continuously as
new data is received. In such situations, the employer may not have a practical
way of reconstructing the algorithm's parameters at the relevant time(s). If, as
the Supreme Court has held, selection procedures are inadequate when their
validation studies rely on ratings that are "vague and fatally open to divergent
interpretations," 236 it is unlikely that a court will be satisfied by a selection
procedure whose standards are completely opaque and not open to any
human-decipherable interpretation.
If courts hold that the use of a reconstructed protected characteristic
constitutes disparate treatment rather than disparate impact, it is not clear that
employers would fare much better. While a plaintiff might find it impossible
to explain how an algorithmic tool discovered redundant encodings of a
protected characteristic, it is not difficult to imagine courts taking a res ipsa
loquitur attitude if it appears obvious that a tool is employing an effective
proxy for a protected characteristic. 237 If so, current law does not appear to

provide employers with an easily identifiable defense; the McDonnell
Douglas framework is inapplicable if courts determine that the use of a
redundant encoding is tantamount to use of the protected characteristic itself,
and therefore direct evidence of discrimination.
D. A Clear Target

One of the most striking consequences of the Griggs decision and the
subsequent development of disparate impact litigation has been the
deformalization of employee selection procedures. As Lex Larson has
observed, starting with Griggs, fear that testing would generate liability for
disparate impact has driven many employers toward increased reliance on
subjective decision-making:

236. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 433 (1975).
237. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (describing
tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a basis for negligence liability).
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This dramatic reversal in business' attitude toward testing was tinged
with irony; for the most part, businesses had moved toward the use
of tests as a way to lend objectivity to the selection process to select
the best-qualified personnel. Starting with Griggs, the courts began
telling employers that these devices, too, could result in
discrimination. As a result, many employers went back to using
subjective judgment in making employment decisions. 238
Of course, reliance on human judgment can lead to adverse impacts as
well-which is precisely why algorithmic tools represent an appealing
alternative. But subjective human judgments leave a lesser paper trail than
more formal hiring practices. It is also harder to cast such subjective decisionmaking by numerous different decision makers as a unified employment
practice that could serve as the basis for a class action disparate impact suit.239
These characteristics make relying on the humans in human resources more
appealing, particularly in comparison to the lengthy, costly, and uncertain

process of designing and validating a formal selection procedure.
These drawbacks are equally, if not more, apparent in the specific context
of algorithmic selection procedures. The very essence of an algorithmic
selection procedure is to take the observable characteristics of a candidate and
reduce them to rows of data. The output of the selection procedure is
essentially a function of complex mathematical formulae. The process simply
does not work unless both the candidates and the selection procedure that
assesses them are formalized and ultimately reduced to computer code, and
the procedure loses its value if it is not used consistently for all candidates
under consideration for a given position. When disparate impacts arise,
algorithmic selection procedures give potential plaintiffs an obvious target.
The inherent explicitness will also muddy the waters in disparate
treatment cases. It is trivial for an employer to ensure that an algorithm does
not use a protected characteristic as an input when assessing a candidate. But
if the algorithm reconstitutes the protected characteristic through redundant
encodings, and if courts hold that using such redundant encodings constitutes
disparate treatment, it will be equally trivial for a plaintiff to demonstrate that
the algorithmic selection procedure is the source of the disparate treatment.
The inner workings of the algorithm may be opaque, which will hinder
plaintiffs' ability to demonstrate precisely how a protected characteristic was
238. LARSON, supra note 84, at § 25.02.
239. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 356-57 (2011) (rejecting class
certification because "[r]espondents have not identified a common mode of exercising discretion
that pervades the entire company" and different managers would likely say they were using
different criteria when making decisions).

Published by Scholar Commons,

47

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 2 [], Art. 9
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

496

[VOL. 71: 449]

reconstituted. But as discussed elsewhere in this Article, 240 that may not
provide employers with an escape route.

The explicitness of algorithmic selection procedures will also complicate
employers' efforts to navigate the intersection of disparate impact with
disparate treatment, as considered in the Ricci case. In the algorithmic age, it
will be easier than ever for employers to eliminate disparate impacts in their
selection procedures-but race norming, boosting algorithmic scores of
candidates from disadvantaged groups, and other preferential practices risk
disparate treatment liability. Less direct methods of eliminating disparate
impacts remain untested in court, leaving employers with no clear options

regarding how to cure disparate impacts when they arise.
And it is almost inevitable that at least some disparate impacts will arise.
Even if an employer succeeds in designing an algorithmic selection procedure

that has no disparate impacts during initial training, adverse impacts may
creep in as the characteristics of candidates and successful employees in a
given position change. Making changes after a tool has already been deployed
is problematic under Ricci, which held that such modifications may be made
only prospectively. 241 Employers will then be forced to make conscious
decisions about how to manage those adverse impacts, and any adjustments
made to the model in response will themselves have to be reduced to computer
code and explained during the course of litigation. Faced with this morass of
legal uncertainty, many employers may prefer to continue to rely on

subjective human judgment-and with it, the potential effects of human
prejudice-rather than risk getting bogged down in the marsh of an unsettled
area of law.
E.

Disparate Treatment: A Brave New World

Given the manner in which disparate-treatment case law has developed,
concerns have been raised regarding whether companies might be effectively
immune from disparate treatment liability if they use algorithmic selection
devices that learn, without any express human programming, to classify
workers in a discriminatory manner on the basis of protected
characteristics. 242 The premise is the belief that because machines cannot have
"intent" in the human sense, there can be no liability for their actions under
Title VII unless the machine was intentionally programmed to discriminate. 243
This concern seems misplaced.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See discussion supra Section III.C; infra Section III.E.
See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585 (2009).
See Charles A. Sullivan, Employing Al, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395, 404-10 (2018).
See id.
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First, fixating on intent means ignoring the clear anticlassification rule set
forth in the statutory text. Under the plain text of § 703(a), a Title VII violation
occurs whenever an adverse employment or hiring action is because of a
protected characteristic.244 That is language of causation, not intent. The
disparate impact theory of discrimination itself first arose out of this language,
with the Supreme Court explicitly holding that employers cannot escape
liability under § 703(a) for practices with discriminatory effects simply by
pleading lack of intent:
[G]ood intent or absence of fdiscriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'builtin headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability.
The Company's lack of discriminatory intent is suggested by
special efforts to help the undereducated employees through
Company financing of two-thirds the cost of tuition for high school
training. But Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation. 245

The frequent connection of disparate treatment with intent in the case law
has never been cast as mandated by the statutory text. More likely, it is a
consequence of the fact that, up to now, hiring practices have been driven by
human decision makers.
To that point-who is to say that courts would necessarily conclude that
machines cannot possess intent? True, many definitions of intent reference a
"state of mind" or a "conscious" desire to bring about a particular result, terms
that seem to refer to distinctly human traits. 246 But other definitions are far
broader, focusing only on the party's "objective" or "purpose."247 Under the
criminal laws of many states, an entire category of "general intent" exists
where the defendant's state of mind is not relevant so long as the defendant

244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (2012).
245. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
246. See, e.g., Intent, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (1 th ed. 2019) (defining intent, in part,
as "[t]he state of mind accompanying an act .... ").
247. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.010 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg.
Sess.) ("A person acts with intent or intentionally when he or she acts with the objective or
purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime."); State v. Salinas, 423 P.3d 463, 465
(Idaho Sup. Ct. 2018) ("Intent 'is the purpose to use a particular means to effect a certain
result."') (citing State v. Stevens, 454 P.2d 945, 950 (Idaho Sup. Ct. 1969)).
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acted volitionally as opposed to accidentally.24 8 Tort law treats an act as
"intentional" when the actor believes that the consequences of his act are
"substantially certain" to result from it.249 Such definitions of intent could
easily apply to decisions made by machines. It will not do to simply assume
that because machines generally are not considered to have consciousness in
the metaphysical sense, they necessarily cannot possess intent in the legal
sense or that intent cannot be imputed to those who deploy them.
Moreover, intent has proven to be quite a malleable concept in the context
of Title VII, as in other areas of law. The Ricci majority stated that disparate
treatment requires intent but, at the same time, acknowledged that the
employer's objective in that case was avoiding legal liability; 250 to the extent
that race factored into the decision, the employer's intent was not to treat
workers differently on the basis of race but rather to avoid discrimination on
the basis of race. Nevertheless, citing Title VII's use of the broad term because
of, the Court treated that motivation as itself a form of disparate treatment. 251
Employers can also be held liable for sexual harassment even if the
harassment was committed by nonemployees and even if the employer had no
actual knowledge of the harassment. 252 A number of courts have also upheld
the "cat's paw" theory of discrimination, 253 under which "an employer who
acts without discriminatory intent can be liable for a subordinate's
discriminatory animus if the employer uncritically relies on the biased
subordinate's reports and recommendations in deciding to take adverse
employment action." 254 If a court is willing to find intent based on a decision
maker's uncritical reliance on another person's biased recommendation, it
seems highly unlikely it would excuse an employer for uncritically relying on
the recommendation of a machine it chose to use, regardless of the
metaphysics of whether an algorithm can have intent.
Lastly, even if some element of human intent were an absolute
requirement for disparate treatment liability, algorithmic selection tools will
248. See, e.g., United States v. Lamott, 831 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2016) ("In a crime
requiring 'specific intent,' the government must prove that the defendant subjectively intended
or desired the proscribed act or result. By contrast, a general intent crime requires only that the
act was volitional (as opposed to accidental), and the defendant's state of mind is not otherwise
relevant.").
249. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
250. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579-80 (2009).
251. Id.
252. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2019).
253. Thomas v. Berry Plastics Corp., 803 F.3d 510, 514 (10th Cir. 2015); see also Vasquez
v. Empress Ambulance Serv., Inc., 835 F.3d 267, 271-73 (2d Cir. 2016); Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383
F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004); cf Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 421-22 (2011)
(upholding a court's use of the cat's paw theory of discrimination, albeit in a case brought under
the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, not under Title VII).
254. Thomas, 803 F.3d at 514.
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very much be the product of human motivations and intentions. Because of
the need to validate selection procedures that may have a disparate impact, a
topic discussed further below, algorithmic selection tools will rely on data that
is labeled by humans-ideally, managers or HR employees for the company
seeking to use the tool-tasked with assessing the fitness of candidates in the
training data for a particular job. Those labelers' motivations and intentions
are incorporated, however indirectly, into the final selection procedure.
Similarly, the training data itself will ideally include employee performance
data, such as supervisor ratings. Because the input of human decision makers
will be baked into the algorithm, it is difficult to imagine courts and
enforcement agencies shrugging their collective shoulders and holding that
employers who rely on the recommendations of algorithmic selection tools
are immune from disparate treatment liability.
For these reasons, the disparate treatment doctrine will not fade into legal
obscurity in the age of algorithms. But it is true that courts developed the
prevailing judicial interpretations of the disparate treatment doctrine with
human decision-making in mind and that the contours of disparate treatment
liability in the context of algorithmic tools have yet to be established. This
means that courts and agencies will have to consider the meaning of the
statutory text afresh if or when they are faced with algorithmic selection tools
that classify candidates on the basis of a protected characteristic-regardless
of whether such classification was intended by the algorithmic tool's
designers or users.
IV. NEW RULES FOR THE NEW TOOLS: A PROPOSED LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
ALGORITHMIC SELECTION TOOLS

A.

Overview

Title VII requires (1) that employers avoid making employment decisions
because of protected characteristics and (2) that employers establish the job
relatedness of any selection tool that has an adverse impact on one or more
protected groups. Although the legal regime governing employee selection
tools was developed without algorithmic selection tools in mind, the broad
principles set forth in the statutory text certainly can be applied to algorithmic
selection procedures. What is required is not so much a new legal framework
as a new conceptual approach to assessing employee selection procedures in

the age of algorithms.
In particular, algorithmic selection procedures require taking the
fundamental principles of Title VII, and the landmark Supreme Court cases
interpreting them, and developing a set of standards that address the unique
challenges posed by Al and Big Data discussed in Part III. The ultimate goal
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should be to allow employers to find innovative ways of uncovering talent and
building a diverse workforce-objectives fully consistent with Title VIIwhile remaining true to the purpose of Title VII itself. It should not be difficult
to reconcile these objectives because selecting the highest quality candidate
for a job while ensuring broad participation by disadvantaged groups is, as the
Supreme Court held in Griggs, the very essence of Title VII. 255 Algorithmic
selection tools create an unprecedented opportunity to advance these goals by
excising human prejudice and bias from personnel decisions. 25 6

Our proposal weaves the disparate impact and disparate treatment
inquiries into a single analytical framework:
Step 1: Determine whether the algorithmic procedure had an
unlawful disparate impact.
a.

Prima facie disparate impact: Determine whether the
gap between protected groups is large enough to give a

reasonable employer concern that the algorithmically
generated model is unreasonably disadvantaging
members of a protected group.

i.
b.

Employer's defense: If a disparate impact exists,
determine whether the tool has been properly validated.

i.

c.

If no unreasonablegap exists, skip to Step 2.

If the tool has not been validated, the employer
is liablefor disparate impact, and the court or
agency should skip to Step 2 to determine
whether the employer also engaged in
disparatetreatment.

Less discriminatory alternative: Determine whether the
employer considered and rejected an alternative
modeling method that would have affected a reasonable
reduction in adverse impact but would have continued
to meet the employer's legitimate objectives.

Step 2: Determine whether the ML tool used any methods that
make prohibited classifications or that otherwise
constitute disparate treatment.
255. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) ("Far from disparaging job
qualifications as such, Congress has made such qualifications the controlling factor, so that race,
religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant.").
256. See Jon Kleinberg et al., Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS

113, 163-64 (2018).
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In broad strokes, with details to follow below, the first step is to determine
whether use of the tool has a prima facie disparate impact on one or more
protected groups. Because the currently favored statistical significance
approaches to prima facie disparate impact would sweep too broadly in the
age of Big Data, however, a modified approach to disparate impact analysis

is required. Instead of focusing on the presence or absence of statistical
significance, the inquiry should be one of reasonableness-a plaintiff can
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact demonstrating by producing
evidence demonstrating that the gap between protected groups is large enough
to give a reasonable employer concern that the algorithmically generated
model may be disproportionately disadvantaging members of a protected
group.

The next step in the analytical process depends on whether a prima facie
disparate impact exists. If it does not, the disparate impact inquiry ceases, and

the only remaining issue is whether the algorithmic tool used techniques that
constitute disparate treatment.
If, on the other hand, the plaintiff does present prima facie proof of
disparate impact, the inquiry would instead progress to whether the
algorithmic assessment is job related and consistent with business necessity.
The key inquiry here would be whether the criteria that serve as target
variables for the training algorithm represent "essential" and "important" job
functions, as identified through standard job analysis. 257 Essential functions
can be used as screening criteria for an algorithmic selection tool; that is,
employers can use algorithmic selection tools to screen out candidates the tool
identifies as lacking the ability to perform essential job functions. Important
job functions can also be used as target criteria to be optimized, but they
cannot be used as hard screening devices. As in ADA cases, the employer's
designation of essential and important job functions would be entitled to some
deference. An algorithmic tool would be considered job related if the criteria
meet these requirements, if the outputs of the algorithmic assessment are
significantly correlated with adequate measures of those criteria, and if the
employer demonstrates that it took reasonable steps to guard against
construct-irrelevant variance in the results. The employee can rebut this
showing with proof that the employer used criteria that were not job related
or failed to model these dimensions correctly.
The third step of the current disparate impact analysis-the plaintiff's
burden of demonstrating the existence of a less discriminatory alternativewould, in the case of algorithmic tools, require a plaintiff to show that the
employer considered and rejected an alternative modeling method that would

257. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(2) (2019); § 1630.14(b)(3).
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have effected a reasonable reduction in adverse impact but would have
continued to meet the employer's legitimate objectives. Once again, we
eschew the requirement of a statistically significant reduction because of the
likelihood that any reduction in adverse impact, in a Big Data world, would
meet that criterion. In the same vein, any reduction in the accuracy with which
this alternative modeling method selected the best employees also would be
deemed statistically significant in a world of Big Data.
After the disparate impact analysis concludes, attention should turn to
whether the algorithm used any methods that constitute unlawful disparate
treatment. The framework identifies two techniques through which
employers, during the development and training process, should be permitted
to take measures to prevent disparate impacts without exposing themselves to
disparate treatment liability.
B.

DisparateImpact
1.

PrimaFacie DisparateImpact

The standard approach to determining whether prima facie evidence of a
disparate impact exists relies on formal statistical tests, with most courts
relying on a bright-line rule that statistically significant differences in
selection rates between favored and disfavored groups suffice to prove the
first element of a disparate impact claim. 258 In the era of Big Data, this
criterion is no longer appropriate because, all else equal, the larger the sample,
the smaller the differences that will be deemed statistically significant. At a
certain point-which we are fast approaching for practical purposes-all
differences, no matter how small, will be statistically significant. That means
that a statistical significance requirement will be meaningless. How then
should courts assess disparities when statistical significance no longer is a
useful criterion for distinguishing discriminatory from nondiscriminatory

assessment methods?
One possible policy response to the diminishing meaningfulness of
statistical significance would be to abolish the disparate impact doctrine
altogether. The doctrine has been criticized by some legal commentators and
jurists on constitutional grounds, including Justice Scalia in his Ricci

concurrence. 259 And in practical terms, one could argue that in the age of Big
Data, which allows for a richer analysis of candidates while reducing the
practical significance of statistical tests, the doctrine has simply outlived its
usefulness. But it usually is not possible to design an employment test,
whether algorithmic or not, that is so comprehensive that it captures all
258. See discussion supra Section IIB. 1.
259. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594-96 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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characteristics predictive of good job performance. Moreover, in the context
of algorithmic selection tools, the effects of past discrimination may be baked
into training data, meaning that unchecked reliance on existing data sets could
repeat and reinforce existing patterns of discrimination. Similarly, the amount
of statistical noise inherent in large data sets create too many opportunities for
an algorithm to settle on parameters that relate more to demographic
characteristics than to ability to perform the job. As a result, the concept of
disparate impact discrimination still has a place in the age of algorithms.
But rather than rigidly relying upon statistical significance-which is not,
in any event, mandated by any statute-courts and agencies should substitute
a less formal reasonableness criterion when assessing whether a prima facie
disparate impact. 260 In other words, policies and practices would be deemed
to have a disparate impact only when selection rates between groups differ
unreasonably. Although this dispenses with the certainty that a purely
statistical rule provides, the loss of that certainty is more than offset by the
benefits of adopting a more flexible standard that can be adapted to the
changing nature of algorithmic tools and the data sets that they use.
Applying a more flexible test should not be especially difficult; courts
have, after all, hardly adhered to a uniform, bright-line rule with respect to
statistical tests in the context of disparate impact suits. The Supreme Court's
"two or three standard deviations" formulation is not a bright-line rule, and
the Court's endorsement of this standard was arguably in dictum and is weaker
than generally supposed. 261 And while courts have generally preferred to use
tests of statistical significance, a substantial number of courts have looked to
the Guideline's four-fifths rule or otherwise examined the magnitude of the

260. See generally Allan G. King, "Two or Three StandardDeviations"from What?: How

Gross v. FBL Financial Services Changes the Statistical Benchmark in ADEA Collective
Actions, 37 EMP. REL. L. J. 17 (2011) (describing a system for finding a reason alone, as long
as that reason taints the employers decision-making).
261. The Court observed in Castaneda v. Partidathat the statistical disparity at issue, in
excess of 12 standard deviations, was probative because scientists routinely consider differences
of just two or three standard deviations sufficient to reject a null hypothesis. See Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977) ("Thus, in this case the standard deviation is
approximately 12. As a general rule for such large samples, if the difference between the
expected value and the observed number is greater than two or three standard deviations, then
the hypothesis that the jury drawing was random would be suspect to a social scientist."). Strictly
speaking, this is not the case's holding because its affirmance would be equally consistent with
a rule that 10 standard deviations was required to prove discrimination. Indeed, Justice
O'Connor subsequently noted in Watson: "Our formulations, which have never been framed in
terms of any rigid mathematical formula, have consistently stressed that statistical disparities
must be sufficiently substantial that they raise such an inference of causation." Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988).
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disparity rather than applying a rigid statistical significance rnle. 262 The

theoretical certainty that mathematical tests provide thus has not been
consistently attained in practice.
In any event, reasonableness tests are eminently workable, as their
continuing popularity and ubiquity in law indicate. Criminal law, tort law,

contract law, and, indeed, employment law are all replete with reasonableness
tests that courts interpret and apply on a regular basis. In employment law,

courts routinely assess whether a proposed accommodation for an employee
with a disability is reasonable, 263 whether an employment decision in an age
discrimination case was motivated by reasonable factors other than age, 264 and
what amount of attorney fees are reasonable for a prevailing plaintiff,265
among many other examples. Reasonableness standards give courts the ability
to avoid the unjust results that can accompany hard-and-fast rules.
In the context of assessing whether a prima facie disparate impact exists,
the inquiry into whether a gap in selection rates is unreasonably large should
not focus on whether the gap is sufficiently justified or explained by the
criteria that underlie the selection procedure; that falls more properly within
the realm of the business necessity defense. Rather, the test should be whether,
in light of the magnitude of the difference in selection rates and the size of the
affected candidate pool, is the gap large enough to permit a reasonable fact
finder to conclude that the test systematically disadvantages members of a
protected group. If the gap raises such a concern, then the employer would be
required to demonstrate that the selection procedure is job related and
consistent with business necessity. The prima facie case would therefore serve
a gatekeeping function, protecting employers from having to validate gaps

that, while significant in the statistical sense, are meaningless in practical
economic and legal terms.
In assessing whether a gap is reasonable, the statistical significance of a
gap would be one factor, but it would be assessed alongside indicators of the
magnitude of the gap, such as an odds ratio or other measures of effect size.
Courts and agencies could substitute other rules of thumb to serve as
benchmarks for magnitude, as the Guidelines did with the four-fifths rule.
This would allow courts and agencies to recoup some of the lost efficiencies
that come with a bright-line rule.
262. See, e.g., M.O.C.H.A. Soc'y, Inc., v. City of Buffalo, 689 F.3d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 2012)
("Consistent with our precedent, the district court properly deferred to [the four-fifths rule] in
finding M.O.C.H.A. to have carried its primafacie burden"); Allen v. City of Chicago, 351 F.3d
306, 310-12, n.5 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that "promotions made on the basis of the assessment
exercise did have a disparate impact on African-American and Hispanic officers" after applying
the four-fifths rule).
263. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012).

264. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2012).
265. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
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Business Necessity Defense

If a plaintiff does establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, the
burden shifts to the employer to show that it has validated the selection
procedure and demonstrated its job relatedness. Because content-related
evidence will not be sufficient to validate a selection procedure based on
passive data,266 the most plausible route to validation for algorithmic tools will
rely on criterion-related evidence of validity.
Under the Guidelines, the criterion validation process must begin with a
careful job analysis to "determine measures of work behavior(s) or
performance that are relevant to the job." 267 These measures can then be used
as criteria in the validation study if they "represent important or critical work
behavior(s) or work outcomes." 268 There is no reason to depart from these
basic principles when validating an algorithmic selection procedure. But a

slight change in wording would help ensure consistency across discrimination
laws and obviate the need to select different criterion measures for different
protected classifications. Specifically, and borrowing from the statutory
language of the ADA, the criteria should reflect essential or important job
functions.

The EEOC's interpretive "Questions and Answers" on the Guidelines
support this substitution. That guidance document states that if a particular
work behavior is essential to the performance of a job, that behavior is
"critical" within the meaning of the Guidelines, even if a worker does not
spend much work time engaged in that behavior. 269 The Q&As use the
example of a machine operator for whom the ability to read is "essential"
because the worker must be able to read simple instructions, even though the
reading of those instructions "is not a major part of the job." 270 The essential
nature of being able to read instructions is thus a critical task for purposes of
the Guidelines.
The concept of essential job functions is central in the ADA, where it is
closely identified with that statute's version of the job relatedness test.271
266. Content -related evidence would be a more persuasive indicator of validity could be
a viable path for interactive algorithmic tools that incorporate chatbots or other means of directly
eliciting information from candidates rather than using static datatesting aspects of job
performance, but such interactive assessment tools are beyond the scope of this Article.
267. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(2) (2019).
268. § 1607.14(B)(3); see also § 1607.14(B)(2) ("[M]easures or criteria [of work behavior
or performance] are relevant to the extent that they represent critical or important job duties,
work behaviors or work outcomes as developed from the review of job information.").
269. See Adoption of Questions and Answers to Clarify and Provide a Common
Interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg.
11,996, 12,005 (Mar. 2, 1979).
270. Id.
271. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2012).
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Given that algorithmic employee selection procedures will have to comply
with the ADA no less than Title VII, it would be logical to ensure that criterion
standards for purposes of validation have a consistent meaning in both ADA
and Title VII cases. Thus, a criterion should be acceptable for purposes of an
algorithmic selection procedure if that criterion represents an essential job
function, as that term is defined in the ADA.

The Guidelines also provide that noncritical but nevertheless important
job duties can also serve as criteria for purposes of establishing the job
relatedness of a selection procedure. The question is how an important job
function differs from a critical or essential one. Here too, the ADA provides a
useful framework. The ADA's job relatedness requirements apply only to
criteria that "screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or
a class of individuals with disabilities."272 The ADA does not prohibit an
employer from taking important but nonessential job functions into account
when designing a selection procedure, but it may not use the ability to perform
such functions as a screening device or otherwise apply them in a manner that
would effectively bar individuals with disabilities from the position in
question. 273 In other words, the ability to perform important, but nonessential,
job functions can be a factor-just not an inherently decisive one.
Consistent with this principle, the rule should be that employers can use
both essential and important job duties as part of an algorithmic employee
selection procedure, but only attributes that strongly correlate with essential
job functions can be used in algorithms that act, in form or effect, as screening
devices. That is, if a validation study shows that the presence or absence of
certain attributes is strongly predictive of a candidate's ability to perform one
or more essential functions of a job, then the algorithmic tool can use those
attributes to remove candidates from consideration for a position. Important
job functions can be used as criteria and serve as target variables and used to
score or rank candidates so long as they are not used to screen out candidates
altogether. In addition, if the algorithm's target variable represents a
composite of multiple criteria, its validity does not rest solely on the proper
selection of criteria. Rather, the employer must also assign reasonable weights
to the criteria in accordance with their relative importance to the performance
of the job in question, as revealed by job analysis. 274
As in ADA cases, an employer's assessment of which job criteria are
essential and important should generally be entitled to deference. The same
272. Id.
273. See Adoption of Questions and Answers to Clarify and Provide a Common
Interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. at
12,005.
274. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 81, at 14 ("If the testing professional combines scores
from several criteria into a composite, there should be a rationale to support the rules of
combination, and the rules of combination should be described.").
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rule should apply to the employer's identification of and assignment of
weights to the various job functions that serve as the basis for criteria; a
plaintiff should not be able to defeat a finding of job relatedness simply by
quibbling about the precise weights the employer chose. As long as the
employer demonstrates that the selected criteria and weights are reasonable in
light of an adequate job analysis, the employer will have satisfied its burden
on criterion selection, and the only remaining question would be whether the
test results correlate with those criteria.
In accordance with the evolution of the social science of test validity, the
rules governing validation of algorithmic selection procedures should also
reflect the need to avoid contamination and reduce construct-irrelevant
variance. Even if the chosen job criteria are limited to essential and important
job functions, there still may be attributes that correlate with the performance
of those functions in the training data simply because those attributes are more
prevalent among the demographic groups that predominate in the training

data. Here, eliminating differential validity, requiring statistical
independence, or both could ensure that predictor-criterion relationships do
not tend to unfairly exclude members of protected groups for constructirrelevant reasons. 275
Differential validity occurs when a test has substantially greater validity

for some tested subgroups than for others. 276 For example, a test that
accurately predicts job performance for men but not for women has
differential validity. The Gender Shades study showed differential validity for
the gender classification systems-the tool predicted gender almost perfectly
for light-skinned individuals but was noticeably less accurate for darker

275. Of course, it would be impractical to eliminate all sources of construct-irrelevant
variance in the uncontrolled setting of recruitment and hiring. But eliminating differential
validation and requiring statistical independence across protected groups would at least help
ensure that such variance does not stem from protected group membership itself.
276. See generally JOHN W. YOUNG, DIFFERENTIAL VALIDITY, DIFFERENTIAL
PREDICTION, AND COLLEGE ADMISSION TESTING: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

(2001).
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skinned individuals.277 Differential validity and its cousin, differential
prediction, 278 are well-recognized threats to validity in test design. 279
Two variables are said to be statisticallyindependent if knowing the value

of one of the variables does not provide any information about the value of
the other variable. 280 In the context of employee selection procedures, race
would be statistically independent of the outcome of the selection procedure
if knowing an individual's race would not help someone ascertain that
individual's performance on the selection procedure.
Viewed through a job-relatedness lens, the concepts of differential
validation and statistical independence are intertwined; if an attribute is
predictive of the criteria only for certain demographic groups, then the
attribute will both have differential validity between demographic groups and
not be statistically independent from membership in those groups. In theory,
an adversarial learning process should allow the algorithm to tune the model's
use of those attributes so that they are no longer dependent on the sensitive
characteristic. That, in turn, should help ensure that the algorithmic tool is
assessing candidates on the basis of characteristics that relate to job

&

277. See BUOLAMWINI & GEBRU, supra note 217, at 5-10.
278. Differential validity and differential prediction are both forms of test bias that create
differences in the meaning of test results for different subgroups. Christopher M. Berry,
Differential Validity andDifferentialPredictionof Cognitive Ability Tests: UnderstandingTest
Bias in the Employment Context, 2 ANN. REV. ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 435, 436 ("[T]wo forms of test bias especially relevant to personnel
selection [are] differential validity (subgroup differences in test validities) and differential
prediction (subgroup differences in test-criterion regression equations)."). The formal difference
between differential validity and prediction is that the former refers to differences in correlation
coefficients between subgroups, while the latter refers to differences in the regression line
equations between subgroups. See JOHN W. YOUNG, DIFFERENTIAL VALIDITY, DIFFERENTIAL
PREDICTION, AND COLLEGE ADMISSION TESTING: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

4 (2001); YOUNG, supra note 276, at 4 ("[D]ifferential validity refers to differences in the
magnitude of the correlation coefficients for different groups of test-takers, and differential
prediction refers to differences in the best-fitting regression lines or in the standard errors of
estimate between groups of examinees."). Less formally, differential validity can be thought of
as differences in the magnitude of the relationship between predictor and criterion, whereas
differential prediction refers to differences in the nature of that relationship.
279. See also PRINCIPLES, supra note 81, at 24 ("[P]redictive bias analysis should be
undertaken when there are compelling reasons to question whether a predictor and a criterion
are related in a comparable fashion for specific subgroups, given the availability of appropriate
data."). See generally YOUNG, supra note 276, at 4-5 (discussing how differential validity and
differential prediction affect validation).
280. In the terminology of information theory, independence means that there is no mutual
information between the variables. Peter E. Latham & Yasser Roudi, Mutual Information,
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Mutualinfonnation
SCHOLARPEDIA
(2009),
[https://perma.cc/RJ89-YJHD].
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performance and not to membership in a protected group. These techniques

are discussed in greater detail below in section IV.C.
In sum, an employer using a algorithmic selection procedure that

adversely impacts one or more protected groups would bear the burden of
showing (1) that the chosen criteria are representative of essential and
important job functions identified through an adequate job analysis; (2) that
criteria reflecting nonessential job functions were not used to screen
candidates; (3) that the employer assigned reasonable weights to the identified
criteria in constructing the selection tool's ultimate target variable; (4) that the
output of the selection procedure are correlated with performance on the
chosen criteria; and (5) that the employer made reasonable efforts to ensure
that predictors and criteria are not contaminated by construct-irrelevant
factors that are correlated with protected-class status.
3.

Alternative Selection Procedures

Under the longstanding framework codified in the 1991 amendments to
Title VII, the third and final stage of the disparate impact analysis is the
employee's effort to rebut the employer's showing of job relatedness by
demonstrating the existence of a less discriminatory alternative selection
procedure. 281 For at least two reasons-one affecting plaintiffs and the other
affecting employers-this framework will prove a misfit for algorithmic
selection procedures. The challenge for plaintiffs relates to the black box
problem: if a deep learning algorithm is particularly opaque or complex, a

plaintiff may not be able to gain the level of understanding necessary to mount
an effective rebuttal.
From the employers' perspective, the major problem with the current
framework is uncertainty surrounding the legal standards. Courts have
generally avoided deciding Title VII disparate impact cases at the third stage
of the analysis. 282 This has resulted in Title VII jurisprudence that lacks clear
standards on how a proffered less discriminatory alternative should be judged,
particularly on the key point of how available and effective a proposed
alternative selection procedure must be to satisfy the plaintiff's burden. Must
the employer provide its algorithm to the plaintiff, who then might attempt to
reengineer it to reduce the adverse impact? That prospect will deter many

employers from using algorithmic selection tools, perhaps even more so than
for prior generations of employee selection procedures.

281. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578 (2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C) (2012)).
282. See id. at 589-91 (rejecting three arguments of an "equally valid, less discriminatory
testing alternative" brought by plaintiffs that defendant would necessarily have refused to adopt).
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For example, many deep learning algorithms in use today rely on
mathematical techniques that are guaranteed only to find a locally optimal
model rather than the most accurate and effective model possible. That is,
from a given set of initial conditions and parameters, the algorithm makes
small adjustments until it reaches a point where further small adjustments will
reduce rather than improve the accuracy of the model. Algorithm designers
use this approach because performing a comprehensive search for a globally
optimal model is computationally complex for even a modestly large data set,
and wholly impractical for the high-dimensionality data sets that are available
in the age of Big Data.
This has two important consequences. First, the process is not guaranteed

to find the globally optimal set of parameters for a particular model. Second,
two neural networks using the same data may generate different sets of locally
optimal parameters, depending on the starting points specified for the
parameters at the beginning of the training process.

Because absolute optimization cannot be guaranteed, there is always a
risk that a plaintiff will be able to generate a model with equal or better
accuracy that has less of a disparate impact. More generally, it is not feasible
for employers to know in advance which machine learning algorithm will be
most effective in identifying a globally optimal, nondiscriminatory model, or
to test every conceivable type of algorithm to discover which one provides the
most accurate predictions. If a plaintiff develops or identifies during litigation
a better performing algorithm that employer had not previously considered, it
seems reasonable for a court to order the tool to be modified, going forward;
but it would be punitive for the court to provide retrospective relief based on
an algorithm of which the employer had not previously been aware.
The legal system could use the fact that the outputs of algorithmic tools
are the result of the mechanistic application of mathematical optimization
techniques to greatly simplify the less discriminatory alternative legal
standards. The essential decisions in designing an algorithmic employee
selection tool are the selection and weighting of the criteria identified in the
job analysis. If the criteria are properly identified and incorporated into a
single target variable on which to optimize, the algorithmic procedure will
find a model that is at least locally optimal. Consequently, and assuming the
employer selected and weighted the target criteria properly, 283 a plaintiff's
later identification of a model with equal or better accuracy and less disparate
impact should not, by itself, suffice to defeat an employer's assertion of
business necessity. Instead, the employee should only be able to prevail in the
face of an otherwise-valid selection procedure if the employer actually
283. However, if the criteria were not weighted or selected properly, then the test itself is
invalid i.e., the employer would have failed to establish the business necessity defense,
rendering the third stage of the analysis moot.
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considered and rejected an alternative algorithm that would have resulted in a
reasonable reduction in adverse impact and, to paraphrase Albemarle Paper,
would still have served the employer's legitimate objectives in selecting wellqualified candidates for a particular position.284 Otherwise, the discovery of a
more optimal and less discriminatory model should only bind the employer
prospectively.

To defeat an employer's job relatedness defense, then, a plaintiff should
be required to demonstrate that the following:
(1) The employer considered and rejected an alternative modeling
methodology;
(2) The alternative modeling methodology would have served the
employer's legitimate interests in selecting suitable candidates
for a particular position;
(3) The alternative methodology would have resulted in a reasonable
improvement in the selection rate for the plaintiff's protected
class; and
(4) The alternative modeling methodology would not have
unreasonably lowered the employer's ability to select the best
candidates for the particular position in comparison to the
modeling methodology that the employer ultimately chose.
Note that this test does not require the employer to identify the globally
optimal model. Given the impracticality of searching for a global optimum for
large high-dimensionality data sets, employers should not be penalized for
failing to do so. If there is evidence that an employer, with intent to
discriminate, selected or manipulated the initial conditions or consciously
chose not to search for a global optimum where it would have been reasonable
to do so, then the plaintiff would have a claim for disparate treatment. But an
employer should not be subject to disparate impact liability for a valid test
constructed using well-established optimization methods simply because the
plaintiff chances onto a more accurate and less discriminatory model later.
Components (3) and (4) of this analysis are intertwined and, as with the
proposed test for prima facie disparate impact, eschew tests of significance in
favor of tests of reasonableness. An improvement in adverse impact is more
likely to be reasonable if adopting the alternative methodology would have
caused little or no reduction in model performance, and a reduction in model
284. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
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performance is more likely to be deemed unreasonable if the alternative
modeling methodology would have only slightly improved selection rates for
an adversely impacted group. The crux of these final two elements of the
employee's rebuttal is demonstrating that the employer's rejection of the
alternative modeling methodology was objectively unreasonable .285
C.

Disparate Treatment

The Supreme Court's decision in Ricci greatly curtailed employers'
ability to use race-conscious methods to mitigate statistical imbalances and,
despite Justice Ginsburg's prediction that the Ricci decision would lack
staying power, 28 6 the current composition of the Court makes it unlikely that
the decision will be overturned in the foreseeable future. Employers seeking
to remove potential biases from algorithmic selection tools must do so while
complying with Ricci's strictures. Fortunately, employers could use machine
learning and statistical techniques to prevent disparate impacts from arising
while remaining within the boundaries set by Ricci. These methods could
serve as safe harbors for employers seeking to correct disparate impacts in
algorithmic selection procedures without running afoul of the prohibition
against disparate treatment.

One strategy would be to engage in new forms of differential validation;
that is, ensuring that a selection procedure has validity not only within the

285. Even if a group of plaintiffs makes this showing, however, a largely unresolved
question in the context of disparate impact discrimination is how to calculate damages in cases
involving competitive selection processes. Say, for example, that 50 white and 50 Hispanic
candidates apply for 10 open positions with a company, and the company, based on an
algorithmic selection procedure using facially neutral criteria, selects white candidates for all 10
positions. Even if the Hispanic candidates brought suit and established that the selection
procedure violated Title VII's disparate impact prohibition, it would have been impossible for
all 50 Hispanic candidates to be hired into just 10 open positions. The appropriate method of
calculation of damages in such cases remains an open legal question. Judge Posner suggested
inDollv. Brown that courts use the probabilistic, tort-based recovery theory of "loss of a chance"
as a basis for calculating damages in discrimination cases involving competitive settings. See
Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 1200, 1205-06 (7th Cir. 1996). While Doll was a disparate treatment
case, its "loss of a chance" logic has been generalized to disparate impact cases where the
number of open positions is less than the number of affected plaintiffs. See, e.g., Howe v. City
of Akron, 801 F.3d 718, 752 (6th Cir. 2015) (remanding disparate impact for further proceedings
to determine whether loss of a chance is an appropriate method of calculating back pay); Biondo
v. Chicago, 382 F.3d 680, 688 (7th Cir. 2004) (approving use of lost chance calculation in a
disparate impact case, and stating "[i]f four people competing for one position lost an equal
chance to get it, then each should receive 25% of the benefits available"). A full exploration of
this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but the applicability of "loss of a chance" theory
in disparate impact cases appears to remain underexplored by courts.
286. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 609 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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dominant demographic groups, but also across all demographic groups. Deep

learning gives employers the ability to differentially validate selection
procedures without resorting to the blunt instrument of race norming, a

procedure outlawed by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that previously had been
the primary method that employers used for differential validation. Another
de-biasing technique involves using adversarial learning to ensure that the
outputs of a selection procedure are statistically independent from protected
class status.
The final segment of this section addresses what often is developers' first
instinct when seeking to design an algorithm that avoids disparate impacts:
imposing explicit constraints on the model to ensure that selection rates are
roughly equal across protected classes. Imposing such constraints sits less
easily, however, with the spirit and text of antidiscrimination laws than
eliminating differential validity or enforcing statistical independence.
1.

Safe Harbor1: Differential Validation

In the Title VII case law, differential validation-that is, eliminating
differential validity from a test2 87-has been conflated with the practice of
race norming, which was the most common method that employers used to
correct for differential validity between whites and nonwhites. 288 Race
norming ordinarily involves using different cutoff scores for members of
different subgroups or adjusting test scores so that the highest performing
members of one subgroup receive the same final scores as other subgroups.
The 1991 amendments to Title VII explicitly prohibited those practices. 289
But differential validation is not the same as-and need not involvenorming. At its root, differential validation simply means making sure that a
procedure can distinguish between higher and lower performers not only in
the majority groups but also within and across all demographic groups of
interest. Some methods for correcting differential validity, such as the race
norming of test scores, may constitute disparate treatment, but that does not
mean that differential validation itself is inconsistent with Title VII. On the
contrary, ensuring that a selection procedure is useful for all applicants, not
just for applicants in certain groups, is precisely the sort of "removal of

287. See supra notes 276-279, and accompanying text.
288. LARSON, supra note 84, at § 27.12 ("[T]he concept of 'differential validation,' leading
to the practice of adding points to or otherwise adjusting the scores of protected group members,
has come under attack by scholars.").
289. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(I) (2012).
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artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment" that Griggs
recognized as the very crux of Title VII. 290
Any employment test that truly measures job performance should be able
to clear that bar. The Guidelines require that subjects of a criterion-related
validation study be representative of the relevant labor market precisely
because unrepresentative samples can result in a test that does not accurately
measure competence for the actual applicant pool. 291 And the Guidelines
specifically warn of the need to check for bias and relevance when a criterion
results in "significant differences in measures of job performance for different
groups." 292

Differential validation need not involve norming if it is done as part of
the test-design process, rather than as a post hoc adjustment to test scores. But
incorporating differential validation into the test-design process would have
been impractical for written employment tests and other traditional selection
procedures. Eliminating differential validity requires complex analyses of
how different groups performed on different proposed components of the test
to determine which components should be selected and weighted so the test
as a whole is comparably accurate within and across groups. That process
would have been exceedingly time consuming and costly with traditional
examination-based selection procedures. Thus, employers' only practical
option for eliminating differential validity was to use the blunt instrument of

norming at the back end. When the 1991 amendments to Title VII prohibited
that practice, it had the practical effect of eliminating employer efforts to
engage in differential validation; only three cases even mentioned the terms
differential validation or differential validity since 1991 and none have done
so since 2005.293

But in the context of data-driven selection procedures and with the advent
of deep learning, the complexity of differential validation is manageable.
Using well-established machine learning techniques, an algorithmic tool
could be designed to check different combinations of attributes, test them for
290. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
291. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(4) (2019) ("[T]he sample subjects should insofar as
feasible be representative of the candidates normally available in the relevant labor market for
the job or group of jobs in question, and should insofar as feasible include the races, sexes, and
ethnic groups normally available in the relevant job market."); see also Albemarle Paper Co., v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 435 (1975) (discussing validation study). The Court rejected employer's
validation study in part because "Albemarle's validation study dealt only with job-experienced,
white workers; but the tests themselves are given to new job applicants, who are younger, largely
inexperienced, and in many instances nonwhite." Id.
292. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(2).
293. The Authors conducted a Westlaw search on January 17, 2019, of all federal cases
("All Federal") and all state cases ("All States") for the terms "differential validation" or
"differential validity."
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validity within each subgroup, and make minute adjustments to the weights
on the components until the model has comparable predictive validity across
different protected classes. The resulting model then can serve as the basis for
the selection procedure.
For at least two reasons-one temporal and one teleological-this type
of differential validation would not run afoul of either the text of Title VII or
the Supreme Court's holding in Ricci. From a temporal standpoint,

§ 703(l)

only prohibits "adjust[ing]" scores, "us[ing] different cutoff scores," or
"otherwise alter[ing]" the scores of a test. 294 By its own terms, and consistent
with Ricci's design versus post-design distinction, this prohibition against

norming in § 703(l) applies only to selection procedures whose content has
already been determined. Because the whole purpose of algorithmic
differential validation is to decide on a scoring system in the first instance,
there simply are no scores to adjust.
But perhaps more importantly, the differential validation process has as
its objective not achieving equal score performance across protected groups,

but rather equal predictive performance-that is, an equal ability to
distinguish between high- and low-performing future employees within and
across protected groups. The resulting model would not necessarily-or even
usually-achieve roughly equal selection rates or test performance across
protected groups. It would instead ensure that the model does not give undue
weight to characteristics that are only associated with good job performance
among certain subgroups. This helps the model focus on characteristics that
are tied to the underlying job-related constructs, rather than constructirrelevant attributes that happen to be more prevalent within specific groups.
When conducted using deep learning, differential validation thus is both
different in time and in kind from the types of protected class-driven
adjustments that Title VII's race norming prohibition targets.
United States v. City of Erie provides some legal precedent for this
distinction.295 At issue was the validity of a physical agility test administered

to entry-level candidates to the police department.296 The City had required
all candidates to complete seventeen push-ups as part of a broader physical
fitness test. 297 One of the expert witnesses for the U.S. Department of Justice,
which brought the suit, testified that this test suffered from differential validity
because "ifa man and a woman obtained the same score on the push-ups test,
294. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l) (2012).
295. See generally United States v. City of Erie, 411 F.Supp.2d 524 (W.D. Pa. 2005)
(noting that different standards when applied to different genders can function as the same
standard in terms of predicted success for a particularjob).
296. Id. at 524.
297. Id. at 532-33.
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the woman's predicted job performance would be better than the man's." 298

Another expert testified that in physical fitness tests recognized by the
American College of Sports Medicine, "the format for women is typically
modified, requiring them to push-up from the knees" rather than with their
entire body outstretched. 299

The City argued that allowing women to pass with a lower number of
push-ups would constitute unlawful gender norming, but the Court firmly

rejected this argument: "[I]n this circumstance, requiring that men and women
complete different numbers of push-ups to pass the test is not 'gendernorming,' and it is not using 'different standards' for males and females.
Rather it is using the same standard in terms of predicted success on the job
task at issue." 300 Machine learning can similarly be used to adjust model
parameters so that the output of an algorithmic tool has equal predictive power
among different protected groups.
Modern social science recognizes eliminating construct-irrelevant
variance between groups-including variance that arises as a result of
differential validation or prediction-as an essential part of the validation
process. 301 Differential validation or some other comparable measure of bias
control may be especially needed in the context of algorithmic selection tools
because of well-recognized problems that machine learning systems
encounter when they are used on groups that were underrepresented in the
training data. Take the example of Beauty.AI, billed as the world's first AIjudged beauty contest.30 2 Similar to the gender classification tool used in the
Gender Shades study, 303 the Beauty.AI judge was trained on a data set where
darker skinned individuals were underrepresented. 04 As a result, the system
was less accurate in rating photographs of nonwhites and ended up picking
winners that were mostly white and, to a lesser extent, Asian 305-groups for
which the algorithm was more confident in its rating because of their greater
representation in the training data.3 06 Given that at least some protected class
groups are certain to be underrepresented in any given data set, differential
298. Id. at 560.
299. Id. at 549.
300. Id. at 560.
301. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 81, at 4, 24.
302. Sam Levin, A Beauty Contest Was Judged by AI & the Robots Didn'tLike Dark Skin,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/08/artificialintelligence-beauty-contest-doesnt-like-black-people [https://penna.cc/9SAC-79EJ].
303. See supra text accompanying notes 234-40.
304. Levin, supra note 302.
305. See id (noting that out of forty-four winners, nearly all were white, a few were Asian,
and only one had dark skin).
306. See id. (noting that when a minority group is underrepresented in a data set,
"algorithms can reach inaccurate conclusions for those populations").
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validation is likely to prove essential for employers seeking to build an
unbiased and legally compliant algorithmic selection tool.
Unfortunately, differential validation alone will not eliminate disparate
impacts in all cases. Due to inequalities in education and socioeconomic status
as well as the effects of prior discrimination, members of different protected
groups will sometimes differ in construct-relevant attributes as well. For
example, in industries where women have been historically underrepresented,
men may have had more opportunities to receive job-relevant training and to
gain experience performing high-level tasks. Those attributes may be equally
predictive of actual job performance for both men and women, but male
applicants would be more likely to have those attributes. That is certainly a
type of "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barrier[] to employment" 307 that
Title VII was intended to eliminate, but differential validation would be of
little assistance in eliminating that barrier.
2.

Safe Harbor2: Statistical Independence

The concept of statistical independence 308 supplies a basis upon which
employers seeking to implement algorithmic selection procedures may be able
to greatly reduce disparate impacts-whether from construct-relevant or
construct-irrelevant sources-without running afoul of the prohibition against
disparate treatment. Of course, statistical independence could conceivably be
achieved through means that do nothing to advance the employer's objective
of identifying the best candidates for a particular position; randomly assigning
test scores to test-takers would result in independence, but it would be useless
as the basis for a selection procedure.
The type of statistical independence that could serve as a benchmark for
disparate treatment is conditional independence. Two variables x and y are
conditionally independent given a third variable z if, once the value of z is
known, knowing the value of y provides no additional information about x
(and vice versa). For employee selection procedures, therefore, the relevant
inquiry would be whether protected class status and the outcome of the
selection procedure are independent given the values of the independent
variables ultimately used in the procedure.
As with differential validity, designing a traditional examination-based
selection procedure to have such conditional independence would be
impractical. But modern machine learning techniques provide a potential path

through which statistical independence can be achieved algorithmically.
Harrison Edwards and Amos Storkey of the University of Edinburgh
demonstrated how this can be accomplished through adversarial learning,
307. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
308. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
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which is a machine learning technique in which a digital "adversary"essentially, a second training algorithm-is programmed to disrupt the
performance of the predictor algorithm in some way. 309
In Edwards and Storkey's technique, the adversary is fed a representation
of the data on a particular candidate and attempts to predict a sensitive
attribute such as race or gender. 310 If the adversary's prediction is correct, the
predictor algorithm is penalized and the adversary is rewarded. 311 Over many
iterations, the predictor algorithm reduces the weights of attributes that carry
substantial information about a person's protected class status, while
increasing the weight of attributes that correlate well with the target variables
that do not reveal information about protected class status. 3 12 Eventually,
these adjustments should result in model outcomes that are independent of the
sensitive attribute. 313

Conditional independence is, in many ways, the antithesis of disparate
treatment. If, in the words of Griggs, the goal of § 703(a) is to make "race,
religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant," 314 that is precisely what
conditional independence ensures. True, if characteristics relevant to the job
constructs are, in fact, unequally distributed between protected groups,
statistical independence may reduce the selection procedure's overall
predictive accuracy. But for many companies looking to leverage the
combined power of Big Data and deep learning, that loss in accuracy would
likely be a price worth paying if the law recognized statistical independence
as providing employers with a safe harbor from disparate treatment liability
while still benefiting from the efficiencies and predictive power of algorithmic
selection tools.
3.

A TreacherousHarbor: ConstrainedOptimization

Correcting differential validity and achieving statistical independence are
indirect methods of preventing or correcting disparate impacts because they
do not alter selection rates in and of themselves. A more direct-but possibly
unlawful-approach to correcting disparate impacts would be constrained
309. Harrison Edwards & Amos Storkey, Censoring Representations with an Adversary
(Int'l Conf. on Learning Representations Conference Paper) (Mar. 4, 2016),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1511.05897.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X8H-ED8M].
310. See id. at 1, 5.
311. See id. at 1-2.
312. See id.
313. Edwards and Storkey use the term "fairness" to describe this statistical independence.
See id. at 1 ("Here, fairness means that the decision is not-dependent on (i.e. marginally
independent of) the sensitive variable.").
314. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
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optimization. In this context, constrained optimization means finding a model
that maximizes predictive accuracy (optimization) but limits the search space
by requiring the model to satisfy certain conditions (constraints).315 In the
context of an algorithm designed to avoid disparate impact liability, the
constraints could be catered to the rules governing a prima facie case of
disparate impact. Thus, under the Guidelines' four-fifths rule, the algorithm
could find an optimal model subject to the constraint that the selection rate for
each protected group can be no lower than 80% of the selection rate of any
other group in the same protected category.

Enticingly, Ricci rejected the proposition that employers may not take
disparate impact into account-even where this means being race consciouswhen designing a selection procedure to ensure that the procedure provides a
fair chance for all individuals. 3 16 Ricci thus suggests that there is a distinction
between designing a selection procedure in a way that checks for and mitigates
bias on one hand, and post-design test score adjustments and conscious
decisions to incorporate protected class preferences into a model on the
other. 317 Technically, using constrained optimization during the design phase
would be consistent with this principle.

That said, the fact that constrained optimization explicitly examines and
makes adjustments based on the selection rates of different groups
distinguishes it from the approaches geared toward achieving differential
validation and statistical independence. Differential validation aims to ensure
that the metrics have comparable accuracy across protected groups, and
statistical independence ensures that the selection tool is not encoding
protected class information as part of its model. Any effect on selection rates
is a beneficial side effect of these techniques, rather than their objective. A
constrained optimization approach, by contrast, makes equalizing group

selection rates a direct and explicit goal.
If Title VII could be viewed through a purely antisubordination lens, such
a direct approach would be unproblematic. But it runs contrary to the law's
anticlassification strictures. True, an employer may not know beforehand
which precise groups will see their selection rates improve with constrained
315. See Introduction to Constrained Optimization in the Wolfram Language, Wolfram
Language & System Documentation Center, https://reference.wolfram.com/language/tutorial
/ConstrainedOptimizationlntroduction.html (defining constrained optimization as a problem for
which a function must be minimized or maximized subject to constraints).
316. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585 (2009) ("Title VII does not prohibit an
employer from considering, before administering a test or practice, how to design that test or
practice in order to provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their race.").
Because design-stage modifications were not at issue in Ricci and the Court's articulation of the
design versus postdesign distinction was not essential to its holding, this statement from Ricci is
arguably dictum, but at least one court has relied on it as precedent. See Maraschiello v. City of
Buffalo Police Dep't, 709 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2013).
317. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 584-85.
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optimization as compared to an unconstrained modeling approach. But that

logic would not save an employer that normalizes test scores after
administration of a traditional employment test; § 703(l)'s prohibition against
norming prohibits all score adjustments made "on the basis of' a protected
classification without regard to whether the employer knew in advance which
groups would benefit from such norming. Even at the design stage, making

adjustments explicitly based on protected characteristics sits uneasily with
§ 703(a)'s broad prohibition against employment decisions made because of
such characteristics.
The Authors would encourage courts and agencies to adoptRicci's design
versus post-design distinction, thus giving employers the freedom to fashion
unbiased algorithmic selection tools without risking disparate treatment
liability. Indeed, the only published case interpreting this passage from Ricci
relied on this distinction to affirm a grant of summary judgment in favor of an
employer that may have been "motivated in part by its desire to achieve more
racially balanced results" when it adopted a new employment test.318 This rule
is fully consistent with the objectives of Title VII, as elucidated in Griggs and
Albemarle Paper. But a rule permitting constrained optimization will likely
face greater resistance than one permitting employers to use more

sophisticated machine learning approaches that avoid such explicit reliance
on protected class status.
V. CONCLUSION

For now, the above proposal is just that-a proposal, albeit one strongly
rooted in the text of Title VII and the case law interpreting it. At this point,
employers considering implementing AI-powered recruitment and hiring at

scale simply do not know how a court would analyze an algorithmic selection
procedure under Title VII. That is one reason the EEOC should act quickly to
clarify the legal standards by which it will assess algorithmic selection
procedures. Employers will undoubtedly be wary of developing (or at least
implementing) such procedures in the meantime.
The framework offers two routes by which employers can avoid liability
for the inevitable adverse impacts that algorithmic selection tools will
generate: (1) correcting any disparate impacts by using one of the disparate

treatment safe harbors; or (2) satisfying the business necessity defense by
conducting a proper job analysis followed by criterion validation. That
presents a conundrum for employers wishing to use algorithmic selection
procedures today. The most efficient and practical way to achieve legal
compliance under the above proposal-using one of the proposed disparate

318. Maraschiello, 709 F.3d at 95.
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treatment safe harbors-is the path that carries the greatest legal uncertainty
because using algorithms that use machine learning to eliminate differential
validation or achieve statistical independence have never been tested in court.
Conversely, the path to compliance that would provide the greatest legal
certainty-following the validation standards described in the framework,
which adhere closely to the Guidelines and existing case law-may be neither
efficient nor practical, and may prove to be a wasted effort in any event if the
Guidelines receive a long-overdue overhaul to bring them in line with the
modern social science.
The difficulty of validation is partially just a function of the difficulty of
validating large high-dimensionality data sets. But perhaps even more
fundamentally, employers may find it extremely difficult to build a
sufficiently representative set of measurable job behaviors and outcomes to
serve as a proper set of validation criteria. Traditional employee selection
procedures were actual examinations whose content an employer could cater
to the actual skills and knowledge relevant to job performance. Algorithmic
selection tools, by contrast, generally rely primarily on passive analysis of
historical (and therefore static) data, which often cannot easily be crafted to
fit the job functions of a particular position. Many employers have only very
general or subjective measures of job performance available, such as tenure
or impressionistic supervisor ratings, which courts have historically
disfavored for purposes of validation when examining an employer's
proposed business necessity defense.
These factors, coupled with the availability of data sets containing
hundreds or thousands of attributes, will make it increasingly difficult for
employers to validate employee selection tools in accordance with the
Guidelines. That underscores the need for policymakers and courts to both
adopt new standards for validation and establish clear safe harbors that allow
employers to prevent disparate impacts from arising without exposing

themselves to disparate treatment liability. Modifying the traditional
framework by eliminating tests of statistical significance and replacing them
with reasonableness standards is also necessary to avoid missing opportunities
to materially improve the diversity and inclusiveness of an employer's
workforce with minimal sacrifice in quality.
Companies today are leveraging algorithmic tools powered by machine
learning and built on Big Data to enhance every aspect of their business
activities. Despite the fact that algorithmic tools offer employers a vehicle for
more effective and inclusive HR selection decisions, with less discrimination
and more long-term accountability, the use of such tools to improve
recruitment, hiring, and other human resources decisions has lagged behind
their use in other business operations. The levee eventually must break, and
legal standards will have to evolve quickly to stem the tide. For now, courts,
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agencies, and employers alike must be attuned to the growing mismatch
between the state of technology and existing legal standards so that the
promise of these technologies is not squandered.
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